Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING (Prime Minister):

As was indicated last night, I move:

That the house do now proceed to government orders.

Mr. W. R. MACDONALD (Brantford City):

Mr. Speaker, when the house rose last night I had given a brief review of the military experience and qualifications of the officer in command of the Canadian forces overseas, General McNaughton, and also those of the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Ralston). It had been my intention, had I not had so many interruptions, to place on Hansard the very fine military records of the two associate ministers of national defence. Time, however, will not permit.

The amendment suggests that there should be a comprehensive reorganization of the Department of National Defence. That presupposes changes in the department, and I presume that it presupposes changes from the head down. Other men may be suggested for those positions. If it is the intention of those who sponsor this resolution that Mr. George Drew, who is set forth as an expert military man, should have one of these appointments, then I say that Lieutenant Drew-for I would remind the house that in no field of battle did he serve in the last war in any higher rank than that of lieutenant-is not qualified by

experience, training or research to be set up as the greatest authority in Canada on military tactics. And I further state that he has no qualifications whatsoever which would fit him for the position of chief of staff, adjutant general, commander of the Canadian forces, or as head of any one of the branches of national defence.

It has been stated in the house that when hearing the evidence with respect to this commission, the chief justice was acting merely within his capacity of commissioner, and the impression has been sent abroad that in the inquiry he had no powers as a judge. An effort has been made to have the people think that he was merely a commissioner and had not the powers a judge would have. In that connection I would read from page 4255 of Hansard of July 15 last, where the following reference is made to the appointment of a commissioner under the Inquiries Act:

Such commissioner shall have all the immunities enjoyed by any judge of any superior court in Canada while exercising his judicial functions, and that any and all powers and authority of any such judge relating to any contempt of court, whether committed in the face of the court or elsewhere, shall be vested in such commissioner in respect of such inquiry.

I mention that so that hon. members may know that the judge when sitting as a commissioner also had the powers of a judge.

I would also bring to the attention of the house the fact that according to the record all proceedings before the commission were heard in camera. In that connection I refer to page 4254 of Hansard of July 15, on which appears a letter written by George A. Campbell, KG., in which, in the fourth paragraph thereof, it is distinctly pointed out that the hearing was held in camera. From the fourth paragraph of his letter I read these words:

It flows from such ruling that all persons, including counsel, were specifically enjoined as to their duty to preserve secrecy as to testimony given, documents produced and all other evidence placed before the commissioner.

I would also bring to the attention of the house the fact that it was definitely agreed that at the close of the inquiry all documents would be delivered up. The next paragraph in Mr. Campbell's letter states:

At the conclusion of the hearing for the taking of testimony in this matter, and some days before the date fixed for completion of the hearing of oral argument, all counsel-

I emphasize the word "all".

.-all counsel concerned received notice from the commissioner requiring them on the day of the final hearing of oral argument to deliver up to the secretary of the commission any and all transcripts of evidence, exhibits and copies thereof, written argument and copies thereof.

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It was distinctly understood that all arguments would be delivered up to the commissioner. What happened? One of the counsel, namely, counsel for the leader of the opposition, boasted after the report came out that he had retained his copy, in spite of the arrangement which was made before the royal commissioner. The counsel for the leader of the opposition had the effrontery to boast that he had defied the agreement which had been entered into, that he had retained his copy. I quote from the press of July 15:

Of course I have a copy of my argument and it is fortunate indeed that I have same.

I do not think any lawyer in Canada would condone such practice. I do not think the leader of the opposition would condone such practice on the part of his counsel, and I say to him here and now, having regard to the example that we should set in the maintaining of respect for law and order in this country, that he should repudiate George A. Drew, K.C., as his counsel.

Yesterday in this house reference was made to two other commissions, the Dardanelles commission and the Roberts commission. I should like to refer to one other commission of inquiry which was set up in Canada several years ago. Hon. members will recall that prior to the war the Canadian government, in conjunction with the government of Great Britain, entered into a contract for the production and manufacture in Canada of 12,000 Bren guns, 7,000 of which were to be for Canadian account and 5,000 for British account. The present counsel for the leader of the opposition in the Hong Kong inquiry, George A. Drew, K.C., objected to the agreement, and by published articles and otherwise he insisted that a royal commission should be appointed to inquire into it. A royal commission was set up, and again I commend the Prime Minister for the personnel he selected. The Honourable H. H. Davis, a judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, was appointed commissioner. Mr. Justice Davis had no political affiliations; he had never been associated with the Liberal party. Prior to being appointed a judge he had been a prominent Conservative in the city of Toronto, but upon his appointment to the bench he had divorced himself entirely from politics. I might say that he had been appointed to the bench by the Right Hon. R. B. Bennett. The commissioner heard all the evidence and made his finding. The finding was not satisfactoiy to the present counsel for the leader of the opposition, he demanded a further investigation. A parliamentary committee was set up. The investigation before the royal commission and before a committee TMr. W. R. Macdonald.]

of this house lasted almost one year, and I charge the present counsel for the leader of the opposition, George A. Drew, K.C., with holding up the production of Bren guns in Canada for at least one year.

Mr. SPEAKER:

The hon. member's time

has expired.

Mr. MACDONALD (Brantford City):

I

would point out that I have been interrupted considerably; I should think at least ten or fifteen minutes of my time has been taken up by interruptions. Yesterday the hon. member for Lake Centre (Mr. Diefenbaker) was interrupted and he was allowed additional time at the close of his argument because of those interruptions. If I am forced to stop at this moment it will be an invitation to hon. members who may not want another hon. member to speak to interrupt him and thus take up the time he otherwise would have.

Mr. SPEAKER:

It is true that two members, I think, were given additional time, but in each case I think it was the sense of the house that they should be given that [DOT]time, as no objection was taken. They had been interrupted to a greater degree than the hon. gentleman who has just taken his seat.

Mr. J. A. ROSS (Souris):

Mr. Speaker, in rising to take part in this discussion in connection with the Hong Kong expedition may I say first of all that I knew many of the officers and men of the Winnipeg Grenadiers. A number of them came from my own constituency. Some of them were neighbours of mine, and one was a relative. I think that they and their relatives would expect that I should say something in this discussion. I should like to pay a tribute to those men for the gallant stand they made at Hong Kong, and to extend sympathy to their relatives during this very difficult period when they are awaiting some word from their loved ones.

For the benefit of those who think that we should not discuss the report or refer to the commission, I quote:

During the last great war, two royal commissions were appointed by His Majesty's government in the United Kingdom to look into various military operations. Lord Cromer headed a commission investigating the Dardanelles campaign. In the second volume of his autobiography, "Memories and Reflections", the then Prime Minister Asquith thus described the way the Cromer report was received:

"The first report (of the Cromer commission) did not survive four hours' debate in the House of Commons, in the course of which it was riddled by the criticisms of (Winston) Churchill and myself."

Lord Cromer was one of the most distinguished jurists of his day in Great Britain. Yet the report he submitted on the much-

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disputed Dardanelles expedition was subjected in parliament not only to debate, but to such vigorous and successful criticism that the report was subsequently redrafted.

That in my opinion was the correct procedure. I submit that this is the proper place in which to discuss the report.

I believe that the errors of omission and commission which resulted in detriment to these forces should not be viewed only in the light of what happened to the forces, but rather with the thought in mind of what might happen to our forces in a much larger degree if these mistakes are not rectified. This situation might well become extremely grave if this same military organization were called upon to move large forces on short notice, forces made up of all the different branches of the service. It will be remembered that this was a small undertaking of some 2,000 soldiers, and they had a month in which to make their arrangements.

On page 9 of the report is set out the order in council authorizing the inquiry. It reads: -to inquire into and report upon the organization, authorization and dispatch of the Canadian expeditionary force and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, the selection and composition of the force and the training of the personnel thereof; the provision and maintenance of supplies, equipment and ammunition and of the transportation therefor; and as to whether there occurred any dereliction of duty or error in judgment on the part of any of the personnel of any of the departments of the government whose duty it was to arrange for the authorization, organization and dispatch of the said expeditionary force resulting in detriment or injury to the expedition or to the troops comprising the expeditionary force and if so what such dereliction or error was and who was responsible therefor.

On page 11 it says this:

This inquiry is concerned solely with the decisions and the acts of Canadian statesmen and military administrative officers who were responsible for the authorization, organization and dispatch of the Canadian expedition to Hong Kong.

Going back to page 3 of the report, the commissioner says, in line 29'

A full statement of the facts and a full discussion of the evidence appear in the appendix hereto which is to be considered as part of my report.

If that were correct, then this would not be a secret inquiry. Moreover the commissioner in my opinion has an entire lack of military knowledge, and I should think that to make a proper investigation of the circumstances of this expedition to Hong Kong the person conducting the inquiry should have some military knowledge.

The evidence should certainly have been tabled in parliament, because it is difficult to discuss the inquiry properly without that

evidence. But there has been a determined effort on the part of the government to withhold the evidence, to withhold also Colonel Drew's letters on the subject, and in every way possible to keep the facts as to the expedition away from the public. In the Ottawa Journal of July 16 there appeared an article headed "Ben Proulx Back In Ottawa," reading as follows:

After being held prisoner by the Japanese at Hong Kong, Ben Proulx returned to Ottawa late Wednesday night to confer with dominion government authorities.

He told the Journal he would be unable to grant any interview regarding conditions at Hong Kong or his escape from prison camp there to India until he reported to the government. While in India he received a cable from the dominion government instructing him not to divulge any information whatsoever until he had reported here.

On page 16 of his report the commissioner

says:

The Canadian government, having no sources of its own of military information in the far east, naturally and necessarily relied upon the government of the United Kingdom for advice as to the military and diplomatic situation there. In September and October, 1941, it was the accepted view, both in England and in Canada, that war with Japan was not imminent, although it was recognized that, to use the words of Major Power, "if war broke out with Japan the Canadian forces in Hong Kong would be in a very difficult position."

Mr. Drew urged that from the report of Mr. Justice Roberts touching the occurrences at Pearl Harbour, it is evident the American government in October had in its possession information pointing unequivocally to an early outbreak of hostilities with Japan, and he argued that such information ought to have been in the possession of the Canadian government. The evidence establishes in point of fact that the Canadian government had no such information. I repeat that the Canadian government relied and necessarily relied upon the British government for confidential information as to the military situation in the far east.

Is that meant to prove that we have not an intelligence service in Canada? Furthermore, what about the joint United States^Canada defence board of which we have heard so much? Are we to believe that the army and navy of the United States during that month had information of an impending outbreak of hostilities with Japan but that our own officers of the joint defence board did not have that information, or if they did, that they did not convey it to the war committee of the cabinet?

That brings me to another matter, Mr. Speaker. I have always thought, with many other people in this country, that Canada should have a representative on an empire war council. That idea has been continually opposed by the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie

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King) and his government, but the statement in the commissioner's report which I have just cited is proof of the necessity of such an organization, especially at a time like this. After all the talk we have heard about the status of this great nation, are we going to take part in this war as a mere crown colony? I suggest to the Prime Minister that we should have an empire war council if we are to conduct our part in this war efficiently.

I listened intently to the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Ralston) last night when for over three hours he discussed the Hong Kong expedition and the commissioner's report. Last January in this house I heard him make his first statement on the expedition, and I expressed my sympathy to him as head of the department, as well as to the families of the soldiers who went on this expedition. But if the minister proved anything in his speech of over three hours yesterday it was this, that there was an entire lack of properly trained men and a very difficult man-power situation confronting him at the time, and that such a situation called for conscription. His whole defence really amounted to support for the argument advanced by the hon. member for Lambton West (Mr. Gray), when, speaking on the amendment to the mobilization act, he said that no one in this country knew whether conscription was necessary at that time or not. He then went on to recall what had happened at Yimy Ridge and Passchendaele in the last war, and the difficulties encountered in getting reinforcements after those great battles. We have the minister's own words that the Hong Kong expedition was a difficult undertaking, that there was only one month in which to act, and that the expedition must go on a voluntary service basis. The result was that many men were taken who were untrained and unprepared. Must we wait for a repetition of Hong Kong on a large scale before we face the issue of conscription? Can we not forget our petty politics and bring in conscription, which we should have for the protection of our own armed forces and to avoid a repetition of Hong Kong?

I sympathize with the Minister of National Defence, because he was not in this country at that time and was not the responsible minister. The acting Minister of National Defence at that time was the Hon. C. G. Power, the minister for air, and as I gather from the evidence and this report there was neglect, so far as ministerial responsibility was concerned, in authorizing the sending of this expedition. The Minister of National Defence

deserves some sympathy, therefore, in having to defend the whole expedition, the whole set-up and the staff-

Mr. RALSTON:

I want to make it quite clear that the Minister of National Defence was in Los Angeles, but the matter was referred to him and the Minister of National Defence takes full responsibility. He was not away until October 9; by that date the expedition had been not only authorized but had been accepted, and a wire came that day as to the time when the expedition was desired.

Mr. ROSS (Souris):

The minister still says that he was out of this country from October 9, by which time not much of the organization work had been done.

Mr. RALSTON:

My hon. friend spoke of the authorization. I was still here when the authorization was given and was responsible for the operation of the department, because the Organization which was done in connection with the force was done by those whom I had put in charge at the department. I do not want the Minister of National Defence for Air (Mr. Power) to have pinned on him any faults of an organization for which mine was the responsibility.

Mr. ROSS (Souris):

That relieves the Minister of National Defence for Air of any responsibility whatsoever.

I can well remember General Crerar, in an address in 1940, in the Chateau Laurier, advocating a thirty-day training period for the men called up. I recall the arguments that were made by this group at that time urging that the men be given at least four months training, but considerable discussion had to take place before that became the law. I am happy to think that at last it was done and that many improvements in training have taken place since, but there are many improvements still to be made.

The argument of the Minister of National Defence last night as to firing practice not being necessary is just propaganda; with his fine record in the last war I know he agrees with me that firing practice is absolutely necessary.

The reference in this report to what General McNaughton said on individual training is just splitting hairs. When I think of what was said yesterday >by the hon. member for Wey-burn (Mr. Douglas) who appeared as a witness before the commission, as to the prejudice which had been shown in this report concerning his evidence, I say that I should like to discuss with General McNaughton, for whom I have great respect, many things which are mentioned in this report. Brigadier LawsoD

Hong Kong Inquiry

was a very fine soldier, and I am sorry he will not be back to tell his story that many of these men who were handed over to him for the Hong Kong expedition were untrained and unequipped.

The minister spoke last night [DOT] of the reorganization of his department, but he admitted that the transport controller, who is a civilian, and had vetoed the shipment of mechanical transport, was still on the job. I do not think it is sound organization to have a civilian transport officer in charge of the movement of troops and their equipment in this country. We have proof of this in what happened to this expedition as regards their shipping difficulties.

On page 17 of the report I read:

It was also not unreasonable to expect some assistance from the landward side by the Chinese forces. A telegram from Canadian military headquarters in London, dated October 26, 1941, stated that the Chinese government had undertaken to attack the Japanese in the rear of Canton if the Japanese attacked Hong Kong, and were prepared to use ten divisions for this effort.

From that it would appear that they considered war was quite possible.

There was a good deal of discussion at the hearings touching political changes in Japan which occurred a little more than a week before the expedition sailed. On October 16, Matsuoka left office and Tojo became premier. It was known that Tojo was sympathetic with the axis powers and there was an impression in Ottawa that his accession to poMrer might increase the risk of war in the Pacific.

As I have already stated, not many days after that the armed forces of the United States of America were so informed.

On page 2S, referring to training, the report states:

Practice in firing the tommy-gun was not possible to Canadian battalions before October, 1941, as they have only recently been equipped with them. There are 42 tommy-guns in the establishment of a battalion. This gun is a useful weapon for close fighting. It is simple to understand and use.

The anti-tank rifle is a high velocity, single shot rifle capable of firing armour-piercing bullets. In general, in its mechanism and use, it is similar to an ordinary rifle. There are now 25 anti-tank rifles in the establishment of a battalion; these are carried and intended to be used by the headquarters personnel of each platoon and by various platoons of the headquarters company. Until recently, this weapon and its ammunition have not been available to Canadian units.

As to the grenade, or Mills bomb, I am satisfied. on the evidence, that a soldier practised in the use of "dummy" bombs (which are similar in all respects to "live" bombs, except that they contain no charge of high explosive) would be capable of effectively using "live" bombs in actual operations. Training both in Canada and in England in fact is given with the "dummy" bomb and "live" bombs are reserved for use against the enemy.

44561-306J

It may be necessary to use dummy grenades in that fashion, but it would be much more beneficial to the troops to have training with live bombs if they were available. I do not think any ex-service man would deny that.

Then on page 31:

According to the report made by Colonel Sutcliffe on October 6, 1941, all elementary training in musketry had been completed anil refresher courses taken. With regard to the Bren and Lewis guns, the mechanism, drill and tactical handling of the guns had been thoroughly covered by the rifle companies and the anti-aircraft platoon, while the remainder of the personnel had been given elementary training. No range practice had been done with these weapons.

I maintain, and I know the minister will agree with me, that range practice is most essential in the training of these men.

On page 32, General Stuart, the present chief of the general staff, was questioned, and on page 33 the following question and answer appear:

Q. Then your opinion is, from what you have said, that any weapon training or anything of that sort that these units may have been short in as laid down in the books, could have been made up prior to the 8th December?-A. I not only think it, I know it.

Any ex-service man who has been transported on these boats knows how little opportunity there is for training on a boat. He knows what a short time these people had, the difficulties they experienced in unpacking their equipment when they landed in Hong Kong, and the limited time which elapsed before they were actually in battle.

At page 35 appears "Additions to the strength of the two battalions":

The higher rifle establishment for a Canadian infantry battalion provides for 34 officers and 773 other ranks-a total of 807 for all ranks. The "first reinforcements" for a battalion consist of 6 officers and 150 other ranks-a total of 156 for all ranks. Thus, a battalion with its "first reinforcements" comprises 40 officers and 923 other ranks-a total complement of 963.

Further on, on the same page, it states:

The Winnipeg Grenadiers, who had just returned from the West Indies, were under full strength by more than 100 men. To bring both battalions up to strength 136 men were required, in addition to 300 for first reinforcements. In obtaining these men there were two conditioning factors-rapidity and secrecy.

On page 36:

There were added (150 as first reinforcements) to the Royal Rifles 154 men from military district No. 2, of whom 52 came from the Midland regiment ... To the Winnipeg Grenadiers were added (156 as first reinforcements) 282 men and 12 officers; of the 12 officers and 189 men came from advanced training centre No. 15 at Winnipeg, 30 men from the advanced (machine gun) training centre at Dundurn, Saskatchewan, 40 from the

Hong Kong Inquiry

No. 10 district depot at Winnipeg (including 23 men formerly on the strength of the 18th reconnaissance battalion), and 23 men from the basic training centre at Portage la Prairie.

On page 39, dealing with "Additions to the Winnipeg Grenadiers", it states:

Brigadier Riley discussed the matter with Lieutenant-Colonel Sutcliffe (the officer commanding the Winnipeg Grenadiers) and Lieutenant-Colonel Graham (the officer commanding the Advanced Training Centre No. 15 at Winnipeg). There was some uncertainty as to the exact number of additional men required, but Colonel Sutcliffe estimated on October 10 that between 150 and 200 additional men would be required.

I know these officers very well, and have soldiered with them at times. I have been looking for the evidence of Colonel Graham, because I think I know his opinion on the matter of the training essential for men, but I have not found what he said about these men being ready to go into action; I cannot find evidence on this point in the report. Yesterday afternoon we heard the statement of the hon. member for Weyburn as to what had happened to his evidence, reference to which is made on this same page. Most of the page deals with the matter of reinforcements of the Grenadiers.

On page 40 it is stated:

Before examining in detail the qualifications and training of the men added, one further general comment should be made. It was decided that the Winnipeg Grenadiers should be brought up to the required strength by volunteers from mid-western Canada, through military district No. 10. This decision appears reasonable in view of the fact that this regiment had originally been mobilized in this district. The primary responsibility for the additions to the strength rested on the adjutant-general's department and its execution was committed to Colonel Ilennessy, the director of organization.

This would lead one to believe that all these reinforcements had been taken from district No. 10. I have already pointed out that men were taken from Dundum in Saskatchewan, which is in military district No. 12.

Then, on page 41:

In the period immediately prior to October, 1941, the advanced training centre No. 15, from which these men came, had, for training purposes, an adequate supply of rifles, bayonets, light machine guns, anti-tank rifles, tommy-guns and dummy grenades. This centre, in common with other training centres and units in Canada, was at that time without 2-inch and 3-inch mortars for training purposes.

Further down the report says:

Permission was accordingly obtained from headquarters in Ottawa to seek volunteers at the district depot. The district depot receives all men when they are recruited and also men who are being transferred from one unit to another. It was described as a "manning pool" for the district. At the time that volunteers

for the Winnipeg Grenadiers were being sought, there were 23 men at the district depot who had been left behind by the 18th reconnaissance battalion when that unit left the district. These men had had considerable training with their unit, but had been left behind because they were thought not suitable for the specialized work of a reconnaissance battalion.

Ou page 42 we find this statement:

The evidence as to the 23 men who joined the Grenadiers from the basic training centre at Portage la Prairie is as follows: One had been in a reserve battalion for one year, being attached to the training centre; one enlisted November 24, 1939, and had been a staff clerk receiving some training until his transfer to the training centre on October 3, 1941; one had been in a militia regiment for nine months; one had been called out in September, 1940, and was attached to a militia training centre until his enlistment on June 17, 1941, when he went to the basic training centre; two were qualified instructors attached to the training centre; one had been a member of the King's Own Scottish Borderers from 1915 to 1919; one had been in a reserve battalion from August, 1940, to May, 1941, when he was called out and attached to the basic training centre.

The remaining fifteen men without previous military experience served in the basic training centre for periods varying from three to eleven weeks-two served three weeks; three served five weeks; eight served six weeks, and two had served eleven weeks. All these men also were personally accepted by Colonel Sutcliffe, or his second-in-command, after inspection.

I understand that for the purpose of increasing the strength of the Grenadiers it had been found necessary to lower the medical standard.

Mr. RALSTON:

If the hon. member will look at the report he will find that the British authorities said that it was quite satisfactory to have men of medical category of C-2 but as a matter of fact no men were taken on lower than medical category B-l.

Mr. ROSS (Souris):

That was lower than it had been prior to that.

There is another matter I would point out. The suggestion has been made that this subject should not be discussed on account of the relatives of the men. I have received a note from the mother of one boy in Winnipeg who is with the contingent, in which she asks me to find out "how many men were taken out of Tuxedo hospital, Winnipeg, and put on the train with the Grenadiers on the evening they left." That may be only rumour, but as I say, it is from a mother of one of the boys.

Mr. RALSTON:

I can only say that I never heard of it. As I have already stated, I think I have heard about everything that could be said with regard to the Hong Kong expedition, but that is something I have never heard until this moment. I certainly do not take any stock in it, nor do I believe there is foundation for the suggestion.

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Mr. ROSS (Souris):

I said it was in a note I had received from a mother of one of the boys. Now I quote from page 45:

On the whole matter I find that there was no dereliction of duty or error in judgment from the mere fact that approximately 120 men were included in the expedition before they had completed their prescribed periods of training.

I have already found that the addition of these men did not impair the efficiency of the expedition nor did it constitute an injustice to these men themselves.

I ask any ex-service man whether he agrees with that statement. It does not make sense to ex-service men.

It is beyond question that it is better practice to send fully trained men overseas than it is to send men who are only partly trained.

I am sorry that time does not permit me to deal in more detail with the report. I have made reference to the controller of transport, and that question is discussed on page 51. The statement is there made that he stopped shipment on October 15. In my opinion that was a very serious blunder, which undoubtedly proves that we have not an efficient organization in this respect, even to-day.

I quote from the bottom of page 55:

Colonel Spearing did not correct the information given Mr. Connor, and a letter was sent at a later day by Mr. Connor addressed to the "Ordnance Transit Officer". After some travels, it reached Lieutenant Winter, -who had been sent out from Ottawa to assist in superintending the loading of the ship. Perhaps any delay in the delivery of the letter may not have produced any result so far as the getting of any of the vehicles on the Awatea is concerned, but the incident is one which a little more care *would have prevented.

That was very careless. On page 59 the commissioner deals with the evidence of Mr. Lockwood, the controller of transport. He says:

Mr. Lockwood is a man of immense experience in the shipping business before the war as well as in his present office.

On page 60 he says:

I accept Mr. Lockwood's evidence. I do not accept Sir. Cooke's evidence that it was a simple matter to load these vehicles and that all could have been loaded.

Mr. Cooke's evidence was not accepted, notwithstanding the fact that he headed the company that owned the boat. He had had a vast shipping experience, extending over a period of thirty-five years. Why should not his evidence have been considered as well as that of the transport controller?

On page 61 the statement is made that the soldiers had to carry a tremendous load and how impossible it would have been if they had not had proper transport. I am satisfied

that if certain members of this government wished to go through the country at the present time the question of transportation would not present any difficulties, and yet when it comes to the shipment of the materials for that expedition there was a difficulty. I suggest that the minister should make a change in this respect so as to assure our troops, together with their equipment, of more satisfactory transportation. I am satisfied also that if all the evidence had been produced before parliament, some dereliction or error would have been found on the part of the war cabinet, of which the Prime Minister is chairman, or on the part of the members of the joint defence board of the United States and Canada, or probably both, and certainly of a number of high ranking officers.

Mr. MACDONALD (Kingston City):

Does the hon. member think it is the duty of the joint defence board to deal with such matters as the situation at Hong Kong?

Mr. ROSS (Souris):

Yes. I think they should have had the information. As I have already pointed out, information with regard to the impending break with Japan had been made available to the armed forces of the United States, and in my opinion our board should have had that information and should have passed it on to the war cabinet. To say that it does not matter whether the soldiers are trained or equipped does not make sense to ex-service men. I think the Minister of National Defence will agree on that point.

There is another question I wish to ask the Minister of National Defence. Who wrote the soldier's manual which was quoted in this debate yesterday, where it is said:

It is a mere 120 years ago that William Lyon Mackenzie sacrificed a hard-earned livelihood, his safety, faced imprisonment and exile for the freedom of speech to attack a selfish controlling group.

This caused quite a scene in the chamber yesterday. Perhaps the Minister of National Defence can tell us who the author is.