Mr. Fulton:

I do not interpret the section in that way at all. It appears to be deliberately and definitely directed towards the question where the offence may be committed. There are no limiting words. At this point I do not want to enter into a legal argument; the matter may not be of great import, because it has been clearly proved that the act has extraterritorial application. However, I do suggest that this is a piece of window-dressing, because it appears, to me at any rate, that the present act has extraterritorial application, by reason of the words:

-the offence shall be deemed to have been committed either at the place in which the same actually was committed, or at any place in Canada in which the offender may be found.

If the offender is brought back to Canada, which must happen before he can be tried, he is then charged with an offence against the act, and that offence may be deemed to have been committed at any place in Canada in which the offender may be found. But he must be found in Canada in order to be tried. The provisions of the English act on which this bill is based are in somewhat the same terms, although not exactly parallel. However, they are intended obviously to give their act extraterritorial application. Section 10(1) of the English official secrets act reads:

This act shall apply to all acts which are offences under this act when committed in any part of His Majesty's dominions, or when committed by British officers or subjects elsewhere.

My criticism of the bill so far is that it accomplishes nothing, or at the best very little. A good deal of publicity and anticipation has been created with regard to its introduction, as though the bill in fact was implementing the recommendations of the royal commission that additional safeguards be provided. The royal commission recommended that there be additional safeguards against espionage and against the communication of information prejudicial to the state. This bill does not provide those additional

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safeguards', in the sense that it makes very little change in the law with respect to the prosecution of persons accused of offences.

I find the bill quite unsatisfactory. What we need is a bill which will provide additional protection against espionage and against the communication of information to foreign powers. The recommendations of the royal commission show the vital need of some such provision. The report of the royal commission makes it terrifyingly clear that we had an elaborate espionage system in this country. It minces no words in telling us that the Russian embassy was the base of that espionage system. It states that that was carried on under three separate agencies, the most important being under the direction of the Russian military attache. We had a spy system in this country and nothing that has happened since indicates that there is any ground for assuming that that spy system has ceased to exist.

I should like to refer to a Canadian Press dispatch which I happened to notice in the Montreal Gazette of yesterday, and which reads:

Soviet Boosts Ottawa Staff

Military attaches are trained observers of three services.

Ottawa, June 20-(CP)-The Russians have boosted the military representation at their Ottawa embassy to five officers in recent weeks, it was disclosed today by the external affairs department. A few months ago the department reported two as the total.

I do not want to say that that article indicates that the espionage system is being built up again, or strengthened, but in view of the clear and specific report of the royal commission, where no words were minced as to the activities being carried on at the Russian embassy, we should certainly be on our guard. These things should warn us that something is still necessary to protect us against this espionage system.

I find nothing in the bill. Other recommendations in the report of the royal commission are to the effect that we need additional safeguards. I should like to refer particularly to recommendations 2, 3 and 6, to be found on page 689 of the report, as follows:

2. That the proper authorities in each service, department and organization take such steps as may be considered desirable and effective, in the light of this report and of the evidence and exhibits, to prevent further unauthorized transmission of information and to set up further safeguards.

3. That all security measures should be co-ordinated and rendered as uniform as possible.

6. That consideration be given to any additional security measures which would be practical to prevent the infiltration into positions of trust under the government of persons likely to commit acts such as those described in this report.

Those recommendations make it clear that at that time the attention of the royal commission was directed to the provision of additional safeguards against a repetition of what they found had been going on. The. necessity of taking those precautions is more important now than it was then, and this bill does not fulfil that requirement.

This matter of security precautions or legislation against espionage and the communication of official secrets is difficult to discuss reasonably, because we are working with a complete lack of factual information as to what is being done. I and others have attempted-I shall confine my remarks to my own attempts-to obtain factual information as to what has been found out as to the extent of this espionage system, as to the extent of infiltration into the government service, and as to the extent of our counter measures and the removal from the government employ of any who were found to be untrustworthy.

So far I have drawn virtually a blank. No answers of a factual nature have been given to the specific questions which were asked, and we are left to go largely on guesswork and speculation. We must work in an atmosphere of secrecy. There is a veil of secrecy over the whole subject, not even a corner of which has been lifted. I appreciate the importance of maintaining security and the difficulty of disclosing security methods, but I cannot agree that it is impossible to give factual information as to the success, or failure if you like, of security measures.

I should like to refer to a couple of questions which were asked in this regard, and the answers which were given. On May 24 the following questions were put toy me and answered, or so-called answers were given, as reported on page 2810 of Hansard,'.

1. Have the Royal Canadian Mounted Police been able to identify all of the 150 persons then resident in Canada, listed in the notebook found as a result of the espionage investigations of 1945 and 1946, containing the name of Klaus Fuchs?

2. If not, how many have they been able to identify?

The minister's answer, while courteous and lengthy, gives no information whatsoever. It tells us what we already knew, that the notebook contained the names of 150 persons said to be resident at that time in Canada. That was a part of the question. We were told that it formed only one item of many thousands of documents seized, and that in this mass of material so seized there were many such notebooks, also desk calendars, memo pads and a lot of other matters not relevant to the question because the question was about a particular notebook. It will be remembered that the suggestion was that certainly the conclusion reached

by many others besides myself was that amongst the 150 names there were, although they may not all have been, some who were involved at one time or another in the business of espionage. The minister went on to say:

The list of the 150 names referred to was carefully checked to ascertain \yhich of these 150 names, if any, were those of persons who could be suspected of espionage or subversive activity. It was found that a limited number of the persons named belonged to either or both of these groups.

In all such cases where positive identification proved possible, the entries were then related to and dealt with on the appropriate investigation files. As some of these investigations are still current, it will be appreciated that it would not be desirable to specify the number of persons identified. The majority of the entries in this notebook, however, refer to professional people and others of good repute whose loyalty is beyond question.

The question asked, with reference to these names, in how many cases it had been possible to establish positive identification. It did not ask how many of them were found to be spies or how many were suspected of being spies. It asked for factual information. It asked in how many cases the R.C.M.P. had been able to say: This is the actual person; we know who he is and where he is. That was the only information asked for, and in an answer of three paragraphs the question is evaded and no factual answer is given.

The second question on that subject was:

How many of the 150 Canadians listed in the notebook found as a result of the espionage investigations . . . and containing the name of Klaus Fuchs (a) have been in the employ of the dominion government at any time since June, 1945; (b) are now in the employ of the dominion government?

Again that is a factual question. I did not ask how many spies; I asked how many of the persons listed and identified in the notebook were in the employ of the government since 1945 and are still in the employ of the government. Again the question was not answered. The reply of the minister was:

This question cannot be answered with precision in view of the time covered by (a) and the vagueness of the identifying data available in the notebook.

The time covered by part (a) was simply the period from 1945 up to the present. The answer continued:

It can be said, however, that the number involved was small.

There again we are left with vague and indefinite replies conveying no information on which we can form an opinion whether the security measures now being taken are adequate, and whether an adequate check has been made on the security of the people whose trustworthiness is so vital to the interests of the state. There is no information on which we can form an opinion

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whether a check has been made and whether the steps taken as a result thereof have been adequate to protect the safety of the state.

Another question I asked is to be found at page 3467 of Hansard of June 12, together with the reply made by the Minister of Justice. The question was:

1. In each department or branch of government or board or corporation set up by the government, how many employees, if any, have been discharged or been in any way released for reasons having to do with security?

There are two other parts to the question. Again the minister's answer was courteous and lengthy, but, however courteous and lengthy it may have been, it was a complete denial of information. The minister's answer consisted of a general statement of the government's approach to this question of security within the ranks of government employees. He said that it would be unfair to give the name of a man removed1 from employment with the government on suspicion of being a communist, because it might prejudice his chances of future employment, and that no information could be given. One part of the question had to do with how many in each department, and that is all. The reason for the question was to find out how thorough the check has been, what departments have been investigated and what are the results in terms of figures as to the number of cases in which action has been taken. That would not identify any of the employees in question, if there are any. We are not even told whether the number, if any, is large or small. We are not told anything on which we can form a conclusion whether or not the measures in the bill are adequate.

As to the question of unfairness to a man who is genuinely suspected of being disloyal, I cannot think of anything more prejudicial to him than mere release from his employment. If he seeks other employment, he is bound to be asked what his last job was. He will be asked: Where were you last working? If he says that he had been in the government service he will be asked: What about a recommendation? Why did you leave your job? Can the minister honestly support the thesis that a person who is entirely unable to produce any recommendation or reasons for release from the government service would readily find further employment? I cannot see that the minister's reason for refusing to disclose factual information is a valid one. I did not even ask for names, but merely for factual information as to the number involved. I cannot see that the reason the minister gave for refusing to give the information is anything more than pure fiction.

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As I say, the lack of information makes it extremely difficult to discuss the question of security on a reasonable basis, because we are working in the realm of uncertainty. No one wants a witch hunt, but everyone wants to be and is entitled to be satisfied that adequate measures have been and are being taken. When that kind of factual information is refused, one is left to draw one of two obvious conclusions. Either the investigation is not adequate or the results have been so disturbing that it is not considered in the public interest to disclose them. I suggest that the second conclusion is unfair to the civil service and to government employees generally.

My main anxiety in the discussion of the bill, in previous discussions and questions having to do with security, has been to find out whether adequate precautions are being taken and whether adequate measures have been taken to deal with such breaches of security or such genuine suspicions as have been aroused. We have had no information. We are invited to take it on trust, and when the safety of the state is involved I regret to say that I cannot do so. I want facts and figures to establish the accuracy of what the minister says when he maintains that all adequate and necessary measures are being taken.

What has come out, however, what has been disclosed in the replies that have been made, gives us ground for concern of a different sort. The information that the security officer in the department is the deputy minister, and that he can remove a government employee from his service on grounds of suspicion alone, gives rise to the gravest concern about the methods being followed. This means that the whole security of civil service employment is under attack. One of the greatest advantages of civil service employment has been security of tenure in office. Before I go further I want to say that another reason why I object so strenuously to the secrecy which surrounds this whole thing is that I believe, as I hope the minister will agree on reflection, it is unfair to the civil service and to government employees generally, because it cannot help but create the impression that the results of this security screening have been so disturbing that nothing should be said about it. I certainly do not want to believe that is the fact. I am confident that the loyalty of government employees and those in the civil service of Canada is as high as it possibly could be. But I suggest that the loyalty of the civil service does not need to be protected by this screen of secrecy.

Mr. Garson:

I wonder if I may raise a point or order. I do so with great reluctance, because my hon. friend is always so generous and courteous in his attitude toward his fellow members that I do not like to raise a question against him. I suggest, however, that the motion before the house is for the second reading of a bill to amend the Official Secrets Act in four particulars. It seems to me the observations my hon. friend has been making about the matter of security generally and what should be done in regard to maintaining security in the civil service are irrelevant to the motion before the house, under which, as I understand it, the discussion should be confined to the question whether or not this act should be amended in the manner indicated. We are not now passing the Official Secrets Act; we are seeking to amend it in certain specific particulars. I want to make it clear that I have no objection in the world to discussing the subject matter of my hon. friend's remarks at the proper time, which I take it would be on the estimates of my department. Then we could discuss them with much greater freedom than here, because we are circumscribed by the motion before the house. I seriously raise the point of order that what my hon. friend has been saying for some little time now is irrelevant to the motion before the house.

Mr. Fulton:

On the point of order, I suggest that the bill deals with the subject of security. It deals with the Official Secrets Act and the amendment of that act, as the minister said, to provide additional safeguards as recommended by the royal commission on espionage. The whole question of official secrets relates to the public service, to those in office or employment "under His Majesty", which are the words that appear in the bill before us and in the Official Secrets Act. The whole intention of that act is directed toward those who, by the nature of their employment, may be in possession of official secrets. That is one of the large aspects; the other is those who come into possession of such secrets improperly. One way in which they come into possession of those secrets is if they have been improperly communicated by those who have properly come into possession of them. So this act necessarily involves the security of those in possession of official secrets, and I submit that the discussion that has been going on is perfectly in order. Indeed, it would be impossible to discuss this bill adequately without referring to the very subject I have been dealing with.

Mr. Green:

I should like to direct your attention, Mr. Speaker, to the first sentence in the explanatory note, which I think makes

it perfectly clear that the remarks of the hon. member for Kamloops (Mr. Fulton) are in order. That sentence reads:

The principal purpose of this amendment is to extend the meaning of the expression "office under His Majesty" to embrace employment in, on or under a board, commission, corporation or other body that is an agent of His Majesty in right of Canada or any province.

I believe that enables the hon. member to discuss the service, and I submit that he was clearly in order in the remarks he was making.

Mr. Garson:

If I may speak to the point of order again, this bill purports to make certain specific amendments to certain specific sections. If my hon. friend thinks the amendments sought are not adequate and wishes to discuss others which in his opinion would be adequate, it is open to him to introduce an amendment or some other motion under which he could refer to these other matters. As long as this bill remains before the house, however, I think the bare question in section 1, for example, is whether paragraph (h) of section 2 of the Official Secrets Act should be repealed and another wording substituted for it.

Mr. Fleming:

We are not in committee of the whole yet.

Mr. Garson:

No; but, as I indicated in my remarks, the principle of the bill is whether these four amendments should be introduced. It is not a wide principle; it is quite narrow. I suggest to my hon. friend, through you, Mr. Speaker, that the discussion in which he has been engaging, which is exceedingly interesting and useful, could be carried on to much greater advantage to all concerned on another occasion.

Mr. Fulton:

If I may make just one further observation on the point of order, I feel it is quite clear that this bill deals with the amendment of the Official Secrets Act. That necessarily raises the whole question of security, including security with respect to those holding office under His Majesty. I suggest that it would be impossible to discuss that question without discussing the whole matter of security. The minister has suggested that the purpose of the bill-and the purpose must be related to the principle-is to carry out a recommendation that additional safeguards be provided. To say that in discussing the principle of this bill one is precluded from suggesting that the safeguards are not adequate, or from urging what would be adequate safeguards or measures, I suggest is impossibly narrowing the scope of the principle of the bill, and in fact rendering discussion of that principle impossible.

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Mr. Stewart (Winnipeg North):

Mr. Speaker, I do not think it is the hon. member for Kamloops (Mr. Fulton) who is out of order. As he has pointed out, he is discussing matters which were introduced by the minister himself-the question of security, how it should be administered, and what should be done about it. It is the minister who was out of order when he dealt with the clauses of the bill rather than the principle on the motion for second reading. We in the opposition said nothing but allowed the minister to go ahead, with a certain amount of leniency which he has not seen fit to reciprocate.

Mr. Fulton:

I am nearly through, incidentally.

Mr. Speaker:

While the hon. member for Kamloops was speaking I was considering whether or not his remarks were in order, in view of the fact that the Official Secrets Act in toto is not before the house, but only certain amendments to it. In view of what has been said by the hon. member for Winnipeg North (Mr. Stewart) I might add that when the minister was speaking I did think he was referring to the sections of the bill in perhaps a little more detail than is usual on a motion for second reading. However, the nature of this bill makes it difficult to present an adequate argument to the house without referring to the sections. I might also add that when the minister was speaking, no exception was taken to his remarks, and I assumed he had the unanimous consent of the house to deal with the bill on second reading in the manner in which he dealt with it.

Referring once again to the remarks of the member for Kamloops he read a number of questions and answers referring to the number of employees who had been dismissed because of security reasons. I concluded that he wanted that information so that he could decide whether or not paragraph 1 should be put into effect. I believe the information might have been better obtained on another occasion, but in view of what had taken place up to that time I did not stop him. I believe the hon. member is going rather far afield when he discusses the whole question of security. The minister has not seen fit to bring in measures other than those that are set forth in this bill to provide adequate safeguards. If the hon. member feels there are other safeguards that should be introduced, he should bring up that question on some other occasion which is afforded to him under the rules of -the house. I would ask him now, since objection has been taken to this general

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discussion, to confine his remarks to the general principle of the four amendments which have been introduced to this bill.

Mr. Fulton:

Mr. Speaker, I thank you for the consideration which has been given to the remarks I have made so far. I confess that I find it difficult to continue, indeed to say anything, as I pointed out earlier, without referring to the matter I was discussing. In view of Your Honour's remarks I shall endeavour to do so without transgressing your ruling. If I do transgress, I hope you will draw my attention, sir, to the fact, and I shall govern myself accordingly.

What I wish to do in trying to relate my remarks to the bill actually before us, without dealing in detail with the sections, is to refer to that part of the bill which relates to those who hold office under His Majesty, the definition of which is enlarged by the bill. It seems to me that is obviously the type of person with whom this bill specifically deals. In his earlier statements on this subject the minister outlined to us the approach of the government towards the matter of ensuring that those who hold office under His Majesty shall be the type of person who can be relied upon absolutely not to convey these official secrets, persons who are not likely to do anything prejudicial to the safety of the state. The minister has told us of the method followed to make that assurance a reality, and it was with that method that I was dealing.

I believe I have said sufficient on that score to indicate that while we have had no information which would justify our concluding that adequate measures have in fact been taken, yet we have had information which causes us concern as to what the implications of that method may be. The point I have in mind here is that persons who are removed from their employment on the ground that they are persons likely to communicate official secrets and are therefore untrustworthy have no opportunity of having their cases heard. My main concern, as I have already indicated, is that there shall not be in the government employ anyone likely to do that, but I should hate to see any measures taken which would go so far as to jeopardize the security of employment generally of government employees. Surely one of the greatest freedoms is the freedom to work. If a man can be removed from office now on the ground of suspicion, as the minister said, while we hope and trust that that right will not be exercised unfairly, it does open the door to the unfair exercise of it. It makes it possible for a man whom it is desired to remove, but who cannot be removed on any other grounds, to be removed simply because it is said he is suspected of being a person likely

to reveal official secrets. Although I insist that I want to see adequate measures taken,

I do not think that is the proper way to go about it.

I am going to make a concrete suggestion, Mr. Speaker, and then I shall be through. My suggestion is that there should be an appeal board set up to whom those removed on the ground that they are untrustworthy or likely to communicate official secrets could appeal if they wished. I believe this suggestion has merit. The board should consist of, first, the deputy minister of the department concerned, who is the security officer, as the minister has told us; second, the Solicitor General or his nominee, representing the Department of Justice and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; third, a representative of the civil service commission; fourth, two representatives to be chosen from a panel of approximately a dozen suitable names submitted by the civil service association. There would be a panel of a dozen to protect the interests of the civil servant or government employee, from which panel two may be drawn in any specific case. The board would then consist of three government appointees and two civil service association nominees. A person released for security reasons may, if he wishes, appeal to that board. The board will not cost anything because the members are civil servants, and this service could be given without prejudice' to their normal employment. It would therefore be a board which could be carried on at no cost to the government or the country. If that were done, or something of the kind, we could insist upon the most stringent security screening being pursued, confident that no injustice could be done, no witch hunt started. If a person felt he was unjustly accused or suspected, he would have the right of appeal. I suggest that anyone who knows in his heart he is justly accused or suspected will not appeal. Only those who are unjustly accused would appeal. With that safeguard, we could proceed without doubt or hesitancy with a stringent security screening of all employees, particularly in departments which are designated as vulnerable.

Mr. Speaker, may I then just refer to one other concrete matter arising out of-

Mr. Speaker:

Order. I must inform the hon. member that his time has expired.

Mr. Fulton:

Does that include the time taken for the point of order?

Mr. Speaker:

I have allowed some additional time for that.

Mr. Alistair Stewart (Winnipeg North):

Mr. Speaker, this to me is rather a memorable occasion, for I find myself in substantial agreement with what the hon. member for Kamloops (Mr. Fulton) has said We have differed in the past, always in a friendly way, of course; but today I feel that he is substantially right in what he has said.

I also accept the legislation which is before us, although I do not altogether share some of the reservations and the doubts which have been expressed. The hon. member for Kamloops said that the bill has failed to safeguard us against espionage, treason and kindred obnoxious things. I do not very well see how legislation could have done that without becoming excessively bulky. Indeed there are as many aspects to treachery as there are quirks to the human mind. The responsibility is completely that of the government in seeing that certain individuals are not given the opportunity to act as traitors. What additional safeguards are required must, I think, rather lie with the security department rather than with legislation.

The minister pointed out in his opening remarks that this bill was based in part upon the recommendations of the royal commission of a few years ago, and that it is designed to provide the state with additional safeguards. The hon. member for Kamloops wants to see the state safeguarded-a proper and laudable object, with which I fully agree. He mentioned of course the fact that there are spies in Canada. I must admit that I am not frightfully alarmed about that, because I think there have been spies here for a number of years, as there are spies in every country. We may not like spies, but sometimes, like the poor, they are with us and it is the responsibility of the government to try to eradicate them. The fact there are spies here today-and I believe there are-should not be a matter for undue alarm.

The hon. member went on to say that we must safeguard the individual as well as the state. Perhaps it is possible that when he was introducing this legislation the Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson) was thinking primarily of safeguarding the state; but it may be proper for us to consider also the safeguards which should be extended to individuals under legislation such as this.

The other day, I think it was in answer to the hon. member for Kamloops, the minister made a statement about security which at once reassured me and at the same time left me with doubts in my mind I was reassured so far as the measures which are being taken for security are concerned, but I was not at all reassured as to the method by which the 55946-253i

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accused could defend himself. In other words, we are facing the constant problem in a democracy in times such as these of trying to reconcile national security with individual freedom, and it is a tremendously important problem. There can be no question that those who are disloyal must not be employed by the government; and if they are proven to be disloyal, and indeed traitors, they should be punished, and punished most severely.

I have no objection to the clause which provides that fourteen years will be the maximum sentence, for I think that examples should be made of those who are in positions of responsibility if they behave in a treacherous way toward the state. But while we admit that treachery must be punished, while we admit there must be complete security, especially in vulnerable departments, I would dislike to see it interpreted as meaning that every department of state had to be screened from the point of view of security. That I think would be entirely unnecessary, and indeed could be dispensed with.

In the last few minutes in which he spoke, the hon. member for Kamloops mentioned this matter of the security of the individual, and it is one which merits most careful attention in every part of the house. We have a situation just now where one man in each department, the deputy minister, is given the responsibility of acting as judge, and it is a heavy responsibility to lay upon any one man. It is one which I myself would not like to have to bear. It is giving too much power to the deputy minister. In. that I do not say I have not a high regard for the calibre of these civil servants, but I think that they themselves might prefer to see this responsibility shared with others. What is even more important, those who are suspected must of course be protected.

The other year I was trying to get some information about security, with the same lack of success as the hon. member for Kamloops. I was trying to find out what the situation was, for instance, with regard to a subversivegathering. I got an interesting answer from the Department of Justice. It was as follows: "A gathering of a subversive character is a gathering of persons conducting subversive activities." As an answer it has its humorous aspects, but one could not say that it is accompanied by very much intelligence. Youi see, our problem is that there are different definitions of what may be a subversive activity. I am firmly convinced that the political actions of communists and fascists in this country are subversive; but on the other hand there may be the possibility of guilt by association. It may be possible that

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an individual went to hear the Red Dean, and some might consider that this meeting was obviously a subversive meeting, and those who went to it were subversive characters.

I think that would be most unfortunate, because there would be some who went to the meeting from, let us say, a purely sociological point of view, to find out what made it tick. Therefore there is a danger about guilt by association; but others may not fear that as I do. That is where I think it is so necessary that we should have a board of review. I am not sure whether it should be an appeal board, as the hon. member for Kamloops said; but I think there should be provision for appeal.

As the situation exists, where there is a character who is suspected he is at the mercy of the deputy minister. I think that where there is a civil servant who is under suspicion he should be informed of the charges which are laid against him, and should be allowed to appear before the review board. What its constitution is at the moment I do not care very much. Then the review board should report to the deputy minister on the facts of the situation, and on the facts alone; the deputy minister should then recommend to his minister what action should be taken, and the final appeal should be with the minister himself. So often we find that dossiers on individuals may be compiled from hearsay, or perhaps from his being interested in some organization in earlier and more indiscreet days. There are dangers, we must admit, about dossiers as there are dangers in holding against people their membership in organizations which they may have taken out quite a number of years ago and long since left. Since that time the individuals concerned have probably changed their minds substantially. I know that I myself, and perhaps other members in earlier years, belonged to what now appear to be rather odd organizations. But I think if it is important to safeguard the state-and no one will deny it-it is equally important to safeguard the individual.

That is why I mention this today. It is unfortunate that a man who is only suspected should be dismissed, because, as has been pointed out, his opportunity of getting further employment is more than limited. I should think it would be the objective of the government not only to safeguard the state but also to safeguard the freedoms which we cherish in a democratic country.

Mr. Donald M. Fleming (Eglinion):

Mr. Speaker, it is fair to characterize the present bill as too little and too late.

The minister began his speech by associating the bill with a recommendation contained in the report of the royal commission on espionage, a report which, if my memory is correct, was submitted to the House of Commons four years ago this month. That report contained in the plainest possible terms, among other important recommendations, the following as No. 5:

That the Official Secrets Act, 1939, be studied in the light of the information contained in this report and in the evidence and exhibits and, if it is thought advisable, that it be amended to provide additional safeguards.

The house was in session at the time. That was the session of 1946. We had before us then the whole startling exposure of a master spy ring in Canada having for its purpose the transfer of Canadian secrets to a foreign power, the most startling spy exposure in all the history of Canada.

As I have said, the house was in session at the time. The government asked the house to take no action at that session in the light of the report. Came the session of 1947, and still the house was asked to take no action. Came the session of 1948, summoned early, as we will remember, in the fall of 1947, to deal with something that the government said was so urgent that it could not wait, namely the ratification of the Geneva agreements. And so the house met late in the fall of 1947. This subject was taboo. Throughout that part of the session in 1947, and throughout the balance of the session in 1948, the government asked for no action from parliament to implement this particular recommendation of the royal commission. Came 1949, with two sessions of the house, and still no request for action to implement that report. Now we are asked, in what are expected to be the last few days of the 1950 session, to take the meagre action embodied in this bill.

And so I say that if the subject matter of this bill is important it was just as important in 1946 and in the intervening years as it is today. Why, then, has the country been kept waiting for four years for this meagre action on the part of the government? There has been no unwillingness on the part of hon. members to discuss the subject or to deal with any measure which would have grappled with the problem or would have fulfilled the recommendations contained in that very important report of the royal commission.

Indeed, the question has been raised frequently in the house, and the interest has not diminished in this present session when it has been mentioned a number of times. The whole attitude of the government in relation to the problem of security with which in a measure this bill proposes to cope has been

that the law as we have it is adequate to deal with the situation. After we heard the Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson) claim on May 3 that the present law is adequate to deal with subversive communist activities in Canada, upon which occasion he referred to the Official Secrets Act, those of us who do not share the view of the minister, that the legislation of this parliament is now adequate, may feel some measure of vindication in the fact that at long last the minister has seen fit to introduce even this bill to amend the Official Secrets Act, with a view to tightening up some of its provisions.

In recent days the house has been told that there is something in the nature of an emergency facing the country which calls for special measures in aid of national defence, and which calls for the house to overlook some of the normal peacetime safeguards parliament seeks to apply to defence purchases and other undertakings on the part of the government. If there is an emergency in connection with the defence of the country, then certainly one would have thought the Minister of Justice would have been bringing forward more ample legislation to deal with some of the internal aspects of that threat to national defence which, on suitable occasions, we are asked to consider.

It seems that one week when the government finds an emergency suitable for its purposes there is an emergency. The following week, when it suits the convenience of the government to disclaim or to deny the existence of an emergency, then so far as it is concerned there is no emergency.

I think we have had enough of this blowing hot and cold. If there is an emergency in connection with the defence of Canada and it calls for special measures, as the government has been telling us, then certainly it ought to be laying before the house some legislative proposals to deal with some of these problems in relation to the internal security of Canada-and it will need to be something more far-reaching than we find in the present bill.

Let us see the contents of the bill as related to the history of the legislation germane to it. We begin with legislation of the Westminster parliament. In modern times the first official secrets act there goes back to 1889, the present act dating from 1911. That act was revised somewhat in 1920 and then, in 1939, prior to the outbreak of war, it was further slightly amended. In Canada the Official Secrets Act of the United Kingdom of 1911 had extraterritorial application, and we had in addition sections 85 and 86 of the Criminal Code, provisions

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which did not go nearly as far as our present Official Secrets Act. They were not so extensive in the scope of their provisions.

In 1939 the parliament of Canada, prior to the outbreak of war, enacted our Official Secrets Act which, by section 15, repealed sections 85 and 86 of the Criminal Code and also repealed the Official Secrets Act of 1911 of the United Kingdom, in so far as it related to Canada. So we have our own act beginning in 1939 and continuing without amendment to this date. It may be said that when our act was passed in 1939 it greatly extended the scope of such legislation in this country, and did increase the penalties. The penalties attached to offences under section 86, subsection 1, of the code were not as heavy as those imposed by the Official Secrets Act.

It is interesting to note that when the 1911 act was enacted at Westminster many of the offences were considered to be misdemeanours and were not created felonies. The punishment attached to the misdemeanours was not at all heavy in the light of present-day standards and world conditions. For instance, the penalties for misdemeanours were laid down in section 8, subsection 2, of the 1920 act as follows:

(2) Any person who is guilty of a misdemeanour under the principal act or this act shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a term not exceeding two years, or, on conviction under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a term not exceeding three months or to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds, or both such imprisonment and fine.

Subsection 1 of the same section deals with felonies. It reads:

(1) Any person who is guilty of a felony under the principal act or this act shall be liable to penal servitude for a term of not less than three years and not exceeding fourteen years.

That was the model used for the Canadian act of 1939. When at that time parliament came to write the penalty section a maximum imprisonment of 14 years was not adopted, the maximum penalty being limited to seven years. It seems to me that in the amending bill before us, increasing the term of imprisonment which may be imposed for offences under the act, there might be some question raised as to why 14 years was not adopted as the maximum term of imprisonment when our act was enacted in 1939.

As far as they go I am sure the four purposes of the bill outlined by the minister commend themselves to all hon. members. The first one, which deals with the problem of extending the application of the act to employees of government boards or commissions or corporations, is necessary having regard to the large number of persons

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employed today by such bodies and also the fact that such bodies are engaged in enterprises on behalf of the government which bring them more closely in contact with secrets which would be of great value to a potential enemy and whose loss or disclosure would be seriously prejudicial to the national interest than the great majority of those who are classified as civil servants and directly engaged in the work of the government departments and who are now embraced within the scope of the Official Secrets Act, 1939. When we go into committee there may be some observations I shall wish to make on those provisions, but I think there can be no doubt as to the necessity of extending the scope of the act to include employees of government boards, commissions and corporations.

I do not propose at this stage to dwell at any length on the second point, namely the extension of the scope of the act to certain aspects of those offences which may be committed outside the territorial limits of Canada. There may be some observations that will be called for in committee.

I have dealt with the third point, namely the matter of penalties attached to breaches of the act.

In conclusion I should like to refer to one or two matters which I think are deserving of mention. I for one have deplored the disposition which has been manifested by certain members of the government every time this particular subject is raised to scream, "witch hunt." Nobody in this house had advocated any witch hunt within the civil service or within any of these boards, commissions or corporations that are associated with the government. But many of us have been legitimately concerned about security measures and have been alarmed at what we consider, I think on ample grounds, to be apathy and want of sufficient and resolute action on the part of the government.

When anything has been said about these matters some members of the administration have immediately screamed, as I have said, "witch hunt." Surely it is apparent, when we hear such statements in relation to civil servants or government boards or government departments, as were made at the last session by ministers in regard to the national film board, that there is full justification for our calling for effective measures to rid the civil service and these boards, corporations and commissions associated with government of all who are disaffected or whose loyalty cannot be fully trusted.

Surely it is obvious, in the light of these statements made by ministers opposite during the last session of this house, that it was the

minimum duty of the government to carry on that kind of survey with a view to clearing all those members of the civil service and employees of government corporations and boards whose loyalty had been called into question by the statements made by ministers on those occasions and whose patriotism and devotion to the public good were beyond reproach. I welcome the suggestion made by the hon. member for Kamloops (Mr. Fulton) that within the scope of government there should be some means by which those who have been thought on inquiry unworthy to be trusted in respect to their loyalty to Canada should have an opportunity on appeal to establish their innocence, if indeed they are innocent. Surely that is the minimum duty of this parliament to the civil service.

But along with that must go effective measures for meeting within Canada from whatever quarter it may come any attack on our security. We know from the disclosures of the royal commission of 1946 how anxious those who were directing the spy system were to plant their spies within the government service and within government corporations and boards which were dealing with matters vitally essential to the public welfare and the safety of this country. I submit that there must be on the part of the government the most effective vigilance in regard to these operations.

Then with regard to the efforts to follow up the disclosures made in the report of the royal commission based on the evidence that was adduced before it, I say that we must press the government not to relax one iota of that vigilance which is so essential at the present time. This measure, too little and too late, is deserving of support as far as it goes. We say we would like to see some evidence on the part of the government of more effective measures to meet a situation which the government at times is prepared to describe as one of emergent proportions.

We will continue to ask why the government has not taken steps to implement and fulfil the other recommendations in the report of the royal commission. For four years we have waited for. this meagre attempt at fulfilment of just one of the recommendations. As my colleague, the hon. member for Kamloops (Mr. Fulton) pointed out, the bill does not by any means exhaust the scope of recommendation No. 5 of the royal commission with respect to the Official Secrets Act. This is simply going a part of the way that the royal commission emphatically recommended in its fifth recommendation in the report.

They did not say that recommendation was any more important than the others. There were seven recommendations altogether,

only one of which has been followed by action on the part of the government hitherto. We would still like to know a good deal about what is being done and what is going to be done as to the recommendation with respect to passports. We do not see any evidence of action being taken as to that or the other important recommendations in the report of the royal commission.

We always come back to this point. When we see the Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson) taking the attitude revealed in the house on May 3 and other occasions that the present law is all right, that we do not need any more law to deal with the subversive activities of those who are at work in our midst seeking to overthrow our institutions, seeking to expand their spying activities in a way that will necessarily always be prejudicial to the interests of the country, then we will continue to say to the Minister of Justice that we insist on the most vigorous kind of enforcement of the law as it now stands. We want more law, but if the law is not to be extended, then at least we will demand the most vigorous enforcement of the law as it exists. Wherever dangers and threats to our national institutions and safety exist we will continue to ask through parliament in a democratic manner for effective measures to deal with them. We will continue to demand on the part of the government vigorous and effective enforcement of those measures that the government has given parliament the opportunity to enact.

(Translation):

Mr. Pierre Gauthier (Porlneuf):

Mr. Speaker, I shall be brief as I do not wish to delay the passage of this bill. If I were to repeat the words used by the hon. member for Eglinton (Mr. Fleming) and say that this bill is too mild, that it comes too late, it would not be for the same reasons. Although I will gladly vote for this bill I do think it is rather mild in the sense that I am more drastic than the Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson) and the government when it comes to dealing with communism. If indeed it comes too late, it may be due to the fact that in the past we have been too lenient with those whose philosophy calls for the complete destruction of our democratic institutions.

In a letter he wrote to his young friend Ivanoff in 1936, Stalin pointed out that the proletariat should aim at the conquest of the world both politically and economically. He concluded his letter by saying:

The victory of the proletariat shall be final in Russia only when the international proletariat,

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having joined forces with us, will have overthrown the present bourgeois system.

Therefore we can never be too strict in dealing with these people or in the enactment of legislation designed to prevent them from obtaining official secrets which they would use to undermine our institutions. It would not do to use an "iron hand in a velvet glove". Let us therefore remove the glove and use the bare hand so they will know we mean business.

I have listened attentively to the various speeches. In my opinion we must not be too indulgent. Whether dealing with so-called fellow travellers, pinks, supporters or ill-advised people that are not too conversant with the communist ideal, let us treat them with the utmost severity, because they are a threat to our institutions.

I therefore accept the statement of the Minister of Justice who claims that this bill gives us adequate protection. I am not prepared to accept it literally but rather in the spirit in which it was offered. He meant that the law as it now stands in Canada is adequate in so far as it is applied on every occasion. However, even though I shall vote in favour of the bill, I maintain that governments the world over, and not only our own, as daily events have shown, have not been alarmed soon enough by the threat of communism.

At present, ramifications of the communist fifth column spread throughout the world. It cannot be compared with that which the nazis operated before the war because it works on a much wider scale and, compared to the other, is as a giant to a dwarf. We must therefore not stay off our guard any longer. We should support every measure, every gesture which might, in the opinion of our leaders, curb communist activity and the chances that those people, working in the dark, have of destroying our institutions.

Unfortunately, the public inevitably look to the government to safeguard economic conditions. People are content to speak of "social security" and apparently feel that this alone will settle the matter. They should also, after thorough self-examination, be mindful of spiritual security for it is only through selfexamination that individuals and governments will secure p'assage of such bills as are required for our protection.

As a matter of fact, if the individual invariably banks on the government, without going to the trouble of studying in order to understand the true nature of communism, he does not broaden his personal outlook and, like

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those who caution us against the communist peril without knowing anything about it, is liable to do things that will outdo the communists themselves in fostering the expansion of their evil doctrine.

We should not always put it up to the government, but we should try to help it. It is through personal knowledge, through specific suggestions and personal example that the private individual may convince his countrymen, not only that he believes in the communist menace, but that he also proposes to prevent its spread by doing his bit, as should any public-minded citizens.

An hon. member said earlier that a crusade must be launched to prevent the spread of this ever-growing danger. I hope that after this bill has been passed, the Canadian government will deal with an iron hand with the activities of subversive agencies in this country. There should be no suggestion at all of tying the hands of the authorities when it is a question of preventing important military secrets from falling into the hands of certain people. There should be no political ties so strong as to prevent our governments from taking necessary measures.

Likewise, anyone who happens to have information which is likely to help our leaders in their efforts to prevent our institutions from being destroyed by those who have long been planning such a coup d'etat is in duty bound to supply any such information to the government of his country.

(Text) :

Mr. J. G. Diefenbaker (Lake Centre):

want to say just a few words with regard to these amendments. I believe the hon. member for Kamloops (Mr. Fulton) brought forward some excellent suggestions, well worthy of consideration by the government. However, I am going to restrict myself to one or two references to the proposed amendments to the Official Secrets Act. I believe everyone will agree that the climate for those who would commit treason or who would become spies should be made as inclement as possible, but I am afraid that climate has not been made much more inclement by the amendments now proposed by the minister. I had not intended to refer td the sections, but the minister having done so perhaps I might be given the same consideration.

As far as the first section is concerned, I doubt whether any wrongdoer has escaped punishment because of the fact that the amendments there proposed were not

(Mr. Gauthier (Portneuf).]

included in the original Official Secrets Act. With respect to section 2, I asked the minister whether during the past five years any wrongdoers had escaped punishment or conviction by reason of the fact that this section was not in the act, and he frankly answered that there had been none. Finally there is the section adding to the penalty. With that section there can be no argument; but, sir, doubling the penalty without at the same time doubling the activities of the department will get little results. Penalties, however great they may be, if unimposed are of very little efficacy in dealing with treason, sedition or espionage. In 1939 the then minister of justice, Mr. Lapointe, placed upon the statute books of this country the Official Secrets Act, an almost exact copy of the British act with the changes necessary to make it applicable to Canada. At that time he was asked why the penalty was not the same as under the British act, and he had this to say, at page 4723 of Hansard for May 30, 1939:

The committee who have been in charge of the preparation of this legislation have discussed the question whether the penalty should be made still more severe, a longer term than seven years, but that was decided against because those who drafted the bill were of the opinion that a more severe prison term would not deter foreigners or spies engaged by foreign governments from carrying on their business but would serve to restrain only such persons as are spoken of as small fry, and that for them seven years would be adequate.

Well, Mr. Speaker, no particular reason has been advanced by the present minister for these amendments, but I suggest the real reason is a properly aroused public opinion. Instead of doing anything adequate to meet the situation, as I see it these amendments merely indicate a willingness and desire to improve the law, but place no teeth in the Official Secrets Act and do not carry out the recommendations of the royal commission.

I should like to have seen this bill submitted to a committee which would include outstanding counsel from all quarters of the house. I see them here. There is one to my right who has just returned from Saskatchewan; I refer to the hon. member for Yorkton (Mr. Stewart). I also see the hon. member for Spadina (Mr. Croll), and if I went through the list of hon. members I could mention many others. Put them on a committee; do what we did in the dark days of June, 1940, when Right Hon. Mr. Lapointe brought in amendments to constitute the offence of treachery. He submitted those amendments to a committee which included outstanding legal men in the house, leaders of the bar. Two or three of them are judges today; others have left public life. Out of the discussions of that committee came an act that was enforceable, that had teeth. It never

had to be used because it was feared; there was the will to enforce it, and it was enforced.

The member for Eglinton (Mr. Fleming) says that this indicates the minister has changed his mind in the last six weeks; that bringing in this legislation indicates a change of mind. I do not want to disagree with my friend, but I think it shows no change of mind. It merely shows a desire to lead the people to believe that there has been a change of mind, for there is nothing in that bill that would have interfered with or prevented any of the things that happened in the last five years in this country. The minister has frankly admitted that in so far as the material section is concerned. If he desired to focus the public opinion of this country in legislation, he could give the members of this house an opportunity in a committee similar to the defence of Canada committee in 1940 of bringing in suggested amendments to the Official Secrets Act concerning treason and sedition, while at the same time maintaining the freedom of the individual and assuring that freedom shall not be used to destroy freedom.

Now, sir, is there any prosecution? There have only been two cases since 1935 under the law respecting sedition. The only prosecutions under the Official Secrets Act were those arising in 1945 and 1946 out of the royal commission. The royal commission recommended that several things be done. It pointed out that there was another spy ring in Canada, and indicated that it was even more serious than the one Ivor Gouzenko was able to reveal after he had made strenuous efforts to interest the government at that time in the revelations he made. He called here at the House of Commons; he called upon the Minister of Justice and pressed for action. It was only after he had pressed and pressed again for action that his views were finally accepted, and action was taken. Surely parliament has the right to know whether investigations have taken place since then; whether this other espionage ring, terrible in its ramifications and implications according to the report of the royal commission, has been investigated; whether action has been taken to punish the wrongdoers within that ring. To all of these questions we receive the usual answer, it is not in the public interest. It was in the public interest for the royal commission to say that there was a dangerous espionage ring in this country. Is it not in the public interest for the minister to say, if there was that dangerous ring and it was in existence in 1946, why it is there has been no prosecution, no action taken publicly as against the wrongdoers?

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The other day I asked the minister a simple question, as to whether or not the dominion was operating in conjunction with the provincial attorneys general. The member for Kamloops (Mr. Fulton) spoke of evasive answers, full of words and politeness. This answer I received will take its place in the same category. It reads as follows:

The Minister of Justice does not send regular reports concerning communist activities that come to the knowledge of the security branch of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to the attorneys general of the provinces;

My answer to the minister is, why not?

The minister's reply continues:

. . . for officers commanding the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in the six provinces policed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police under contract are responsible for keeping the respective attorneys general informed regarding communist activities,

The investigations made by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police are not the only security investigation. Why are the other security branch investigations not communicated to the provinces? One wonders sometimes why this-

Mr. Garson:

Will my hon. friend read the remainder of the answer?