Mrs. Fairclough:

That may well be.

Mr. Drew:

Will the Minister of Justice state whether he has considered the fact that the air line concerned can only operate under agreement with the dominion government; that the conduct of that company is of necessity constantly under the supervision of the dominion government, and that the dominion government can therefore at all times exercise some measure of direction over the company's conduct in Canada?

Mr. Garson:

My impression is-and on several occasions I have understood the hon. member himself to say-that in carrying

on our business in Canada, we invite foreign companies to come into Canada to do business here. Those companies usually do business under our laws and are answerable to our courts as regards their relationship with their employees. Answering the hon. member's question, I had not thought he would regard it as proper that we should use licensing by an entirely different department of government to discipline a company in respect of a matter which one would have thought that the proper provincial authorities and the -company would if necessary have determined by the proper courts.

Mr. Drew:

Has the minister made inquiries as to whether in- any event the lie detector test and this fantastic procedure could at any time have been a method in Canada, no matter what arrangement was made?

Mr. Cruickshank:

It has never been made to apply here in any event.

Mr. Garson:

I am very glad to answer the hon. member's question. I have made that inquiry and my information is that a lie detector test has no probative value in our courts, and I believe it has no probative value in most United States courts.

Mr. George H. Hees (Broadview):

I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Resources and Development. In view of the statement in the Ontario legislature yesterday, is the -government considering cooperation with the provinces to make -possible low rental housing in centres of less than 5,000 population?

Hon. Robert H. Winters (Minister of Resources and Development):

The hon. member was kind enough to send to my office the -clipping to which he has referred. I have no knowledge of -the statement beyond what was in the clipping. I presume the particular point the minister of planning and development in Toronto was discussing -in fact, as I recall it, the clipping so stated-was operations under section 35 of the National Housing Act, and, as hon. members know, that is the public housing section. This section is designed to meet a need normally arising out of metropolitan conditions wherein it is -considered that all the taxpayers should be asked to provide housing for those citizens who are not otherwise able to obtain it. In such cases it is the responsibility of all the levels of government concerned to determine whether such -conditions exist in any municipality.

Mr. A. Earl Catherwood (Haldimand):

On

Tuesday, April 1, the hon. member for Ottawa East (Mr. Richard) asked the Secretary of State if a holiday would be granted to civil servants on the Saturday following Good Friday. I understand that yesterday the cabinet discussed this matter. Will the minister state what action has been taken?

Hon. F. G. Bradley (Secretary of State):

Consideration has been given to the suggestion of the hon. member for Ottawa East, but in the circumstances it has not been found feasible to accede to his request.

Mr. M. J. Coldwell (Roseiown-Biggar):

Mr. Speaker, we have before us this afternoon what is indeed a very important resolution. I regret that, because of the arrangements for debate in this house during the first part of this session, it has not been found possible to debate this resolution before.

I want to join immediately with the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) and the hon. member for Peel (Mr. Graydon) in expressing the hope that the treaty now under consideration will do all that they, and all the rest of us, desire.

The treaty before the house is, I suppose, one of the most magnanimous in history. So far as I am able to discover, what we usually call punitive clauses are almost entirely absent, and presumably the treaty is intended to lay the foundation for the building of a democratic and peaceful nation. Indeed, I think that is what the Department of External Affairs had in mind when, on page 23 of their report for 1951, they said this:

The treaty was generous, restoring sovereignty to Japan and placing no restrictions on its economy or on its ability to defend itself. Reconciliation, and not revenge, was the main goal. The signatory powers agreed that Japan should, in principle, pay reparations for the devastation and suffering it caused during the war.

Then, it added this:

However, they recognized that Japan lacked the physical capacity to recompense its wartime victims if it was to achieve a viable economy.

Japanese Peace Treaty

We join in the hope that the generous treatment thus accorded to Japan under this treaty will produce the desired results. Canadians generally, I am certain, will support the principle of treaties of this kind- treaties of reconciliation rather than revenge.

When we look back over the post-war years we remember that certain military and political leaders were tried and executed for what one must describe as the terrible atrocities and indescribable conditions which were made known to us both during the war and upon the return to their respective countries of those who suffered at the hands of the military arm of imperial Japan. And I want to make that distinction, because I do not think that the atrocities and cruelties that were inflicted on our nationals, and those engaged with us in the war, represented the will of the Japanese people.

I do not propose to recount the horrors reported from Hong Kong, Singapore and other parts of the Orient which the Japanese invaded. Suffice it to say that these were a repetition of the barbarities which the late prime minister, Mr. Mackenzie King, described to this house on March 10, 1942, which had aroused the horror of the civilized world at the time of the Nanking massacre in 1937, but of which the rest of the world took little heed when they occurred, and were perpetrated on the Chinese.

We accept the treaty, and we support, with some reservations, Canada's approval of it. We remember, too, that the armament of Japan was assisted by powerful commercial interests in North America including our own country. We of the C.C.F. protested against the export of vital war materials to that country in the years prior to the attack upon Pearl Harbor.

I do not propose to place upon the record the numerous references that can be found in Hansard between 1930 and 1941 to that effect, to confirm the attitude I say we consistently adopted throughout those fatal years. Suffice it to say that we protested vigorously against the strengthening of the Japanese army and armaments industry by large and continuous exports of basic materials such as copper, nickel, scrap iron and the like, all of which left our shores almost until the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and our declaration of war.

I remember that a clever versifier who writes under various names in British journals said this, shortly after the attack upon the Dutch East Indies:

We sent too little and too late

To save ourselves, to save the Dutch,

Because, unconscious of our fate,

We'd sold the enemy too much.

Japanese Peace Treaty

I think that little verse describes exactly what happened prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. It is true that Canada was the first of the allied nations to declare war on Japan. The Canadian cabinet, as I remember it,- and I remember it well-after consultation by telephone with the then leader of the official opposition, the late Hon. R. B. Hanson, with the then leader of the Social Credit group, the hon. member for Lethbridge (Mr. Blackmore) and with myself, issued a proclamation on the evening of Sunday, December 7, the very day Pearl Harbor was attacked. Canada thus proclaimed that a state of war existed some hours before the United States or any other country was able to make a similar declaration.

Nor must we forget today, or fail indeed to pay tribute to, the ill-equipped Canadian troops at Hong Kong who suffered such serious casualties by the unprovoked attack, and the several thousands of them who languished, suffered and died in Japanese prison camps. We should remember these things-not for the sake of demanding revenge, but to remind us that any steps we take now should make it certain that neither we nor the rest of the world shall again be subjected to sudden and unprovoked attacks from that quarter.

So, in approving the generous treaty now before us, we are, as it were, forgetting and forgiving the sufferings which a militarized Japan inflicted upon a large section of the world. And I hope that no nation will endeavour to persuade the Japanese people again to militarize themselves. Indeed, the first acts of their own post-war Diet indicated that it was their wish to pursue a peaceful course; and we should help them in that desire.

This, I may say, is in line with our attitude throughout the post-war years, and indeed, if I may say so, stems too out of the feeling we had during the war that Canadian citizens of Japanese origin were subjected to hardships in our own country

but, of course, nothing comparable with what happened to our nationals who happened to be in Japan and the countries controlled by Japan during wartime.

Well, we are happy to note that there are indications that the Japanese people appreciate the fact that there are no humiliating and punitive provisions such as were to be found in the Versailles treaty signed with Germany in 1919. This of course is owing to the desire of the people in the democratic countries to promote good will among their former enemies, and also to the realities of the world situation. Japan is too vital a country strategically to be alienated from friendship with the democratic powers.

fMr. Coldwell.J

I have read carefully the testimony of Mr. John Foster Dulles before the committee on foreign relations of the United States senate when he appeared before that body on January 21 of this year. It is obvious that in his opinion the treaty has been made with an eye to the international situation, the struggle for men's minds, and the necessity of strengthening Japan against the possibility of communist aggression from the mainland.

Mr. Dulles implied-and from what I have been able to read of his statements from time to time, this opinion of mine is confirmed-that all encouragement must be given to the overthrow of the present government at Peking in China. In order to confirm my opinion, or at least to bring some authority to it, I think it would be well to place on the record a more extended quotation of what Mr. Dulles said before the senate committee on foreign affairs in the United States. At page 12 of the official report Mr. Dulles is quoted as having said:

I can say to you with complete assurance that the best informed Japanese are totally convinced, as X think we are, that the alien doctrine of communism cannot permanently conquer the Chinese spirit or liquidate the innate individualism of the Chinese race. The Chinese nation will not permanently suffer the imposition of a tyranny which places it in the service of alien masters.

There will be an end to a tyranny which the Chinese themselves will come more and more to hate. We should assume the impermanence, not the permanence, of the present Moscow oriented rule of China.

And note this:

We cannot expect that this change in China will take place automatically.

To realize that change will require something besides negative and purely defensive policies in Asia on the part of the free world, notably the United States. It will require a determination to promote freedom and independence in Asia and-

Note these words:

-action consistent with that determination as opportunities arise.

"The mood of the people of Japan, like the mood of other free peoples who are close neighbours of Asian communism, will, in the long run, largely depend on the attitude and action of the other free nations. If they persevere in positive policies in support of real national independence in Asia, Japan will be a dependable and able coadjutor."

I 'think this bears no other interpretation than the one that I placed upon it in my speech of March 6 last. This, too, I think, was emphasized by the United States approval of the tentative decision of the Japanese government to recognize the Formosan administration headed by Chiang Kai-shek as the government of China.

Of the Formosan situation and possible settlement Mr. Walter Lippmann says in his feature article in the Montreal Gazette today:

"First, that the Cairo declaration must be honoured, and that the Chinese suzerainty over Formosa will have to be recognized in a final peace settlement: and, second, that the Formosan people, who have never been governed from China, should not now be put under Chinese administration, but should be made into an autonomous state, guaranteed by the United Nations though under Chinese suzerainty -demilitarized except for a local Formosan militia, neutralized for military purposes against all the great powers including China, Japan, Russia and the United States; and, third, that Gen. Chiang Kai-shek and his family and retainers should be allowed to depart in safety from Formosa and granted asylum, preferably not in the Far East; and, fourth, that Chiang's troops should be demobilized and that those wishing it should be repatriated to their homes in China.

Proposals of this sort, if they were agreed to, could provide a basis for an armistice and a working arrangement in Korea, and for an approach to a cease-fire and an arrangement in Indo-China."

These are Mr. Lippmann's views with regard to the final settlement of Formosa's future as part of the general Far Eastern settlement after the Korean armistice has been achieved; and it is indeed in line with the policy that we have from time to (time suggested here and elsewhere in the last six or seven months.

Of course this treaty with Japan, which is now before us, cannot be excluded from the discussion when the nations make any permanent Far Eastern settlement. I wish to say at once, as I have said before, that we support the policy enunciated from time to time by the Secretary of State for External Affairs on Canada's neutrality in connection with Formosa and the Formosan situation. The treaty now before us is not one which has been enthusiastically accepted by some nations which attached their signatures to it at San Francisco. I do not think we can accept it enthusiastically either.

It will be remembered that the French foreign affairs commission of the French national assembly, on August 10 of last year, passed a resolution, by twenty-one votes to two, deploring the fact that France had had no part in drawing up the outline of the treaty from the beginning. On August 3 last the Netherlands government made serious objections on the ground that no provision was made for reparations and there was no protection of the tuna fisheries off the coast of Dutch New Guinea^

The Australian, government, as the hon. member for Peel said last night, when he quoted so extensively from Mr. Menzies' address on the occasion of the treaty coming before the Australian house, accepted it as a reasonable basis on which to bring about a settlement. But Dr. Evatt, who was the

Japanese Peace Treaty Australian minister of external affairs during a good part of the war and in the post-war period, strongly criticized it-and I use his words-as "appeasement of a cruel enemy", and stated that Australians of all parties viewed-and again I quote-the "clearly intended rearmament" of Japan with the deepest anxiety and resentment.

New Zealand made a somewhat similar protest. All parties in the Philippines joined on July 14, 1951, in a unanimous statement describing the treaty as calculated to restore Japan to a dominant position in Asia. Burma refused to sign it, as did India. On August 27, 1951, Prime Minister Nehru sent a message to the United States, in which he gave the reasons why India would not participate in this treaty. He said then:

"Throughout the negotiations that have taken place between the two governments-

That is, the government of India and the government of the United States. I continue: -on the subject of the treaty, the government of India have laid emphasis upon two fundamental objectives: (1) The treaty terms should concede to Japan a position of honour, equality, and contentment among the community of free nations; (2) They should be so framed as to enable all the countries especially interested in the maintenance of a stable peace in the Far East to subscribe to the treaty sooner or later.

It goes on:

The government of India have, after most careful thought, come to the conclusion that the treaty does not in material respects satisfy either of these two criteria.

3. Condition (1)

(a) It is only natural to expect that Japan should desire restoration in full of her sovereignty over the territory of which the inhabitants have a historical affinity with her own people and which she has not acquired by aggression from any other country. The Ryukyu and Bonin islands fully satisfy this description. Nevertheless the treaty proposes that, until the United States government seek and obtain trusteeship over these islands, they should continue to be subject to the legislative and administrative control of the United States. It is apparent to the government of India that such an arrangement cannot but be a source of dissatisfaction to large sections of the Japanese people, and must carry the seed of future dispute-and possibly conflict-in the Far East.

(b) The government of India recognize that, as a sovereign nation, Japan should have the right to make arrangements for her defence as provided in article 5 of the treaty. If, in exercise of this right Japan should decide to enter in defensive agreements with friendly powers, no one could reasonably object to this. But such right should be exercised by the government of Japan, when Japan has become truly sovereign.

I think the point Nehru is making is that defensive alliance should await full sovereignty. I continue:

The provision in the treaty which suggests that present occupation forces may stay on in Japan as part of such defensive agreements is bound to give rise to the impression that the agreements do not represent a decision taken by Japan in full

Japanese Peace Treaty enjoyment of her freedom as a sovereign nation. The effect of this, not only on the people of Japan-

In my opinion what follows is equally or even more important.

The effect of this, not only on the people of Japan, but upon large sections of the people of Asia, is bound to be most unfortunate.

4. Condition (2). As already stated, the government of India attach the greatest importance to the treaty providing that the island of Formosa should be returned to China. The time and manner of such return might be the subject of separate negotiations,-

This is of course in line with what our Secretary of State for External Affairs has said. The paragraph goes on:

-but to leave the future of the island undetermined, in spite of past international agreements, in a document which attempts to regulate the relations of Japan with all governments that were engaged in the last war against her, does not appear to the government of India to be either just or expedient.

Again, I say, perhaps expedience may be a consideration which in the eyes of some might be the more impressive.

Mutatis mutandis, the same argument applies to the Kurile islands and to South Sakhalin.

The final paragraph which I shall read goes on to say:

For the foregoing reasons the government of India have decided with regret that they cannot be parties to this treaty. It is their sincere hope that a lasting peace will prevail in the Far East, and to that end they will continue to co-operate with the United States and other governments in such a manner as may be open to them consistently with the principles on which their foreign policy is based. As a first step, it is their intention, as soon as this may be practicable, to put an end to the state of war between them and Japan, and to establish full diplomatic relations with that country.

As I have said on more than one occasion, in dealing with Asian problems we should give considerable weight to the opinions of the government of India. Here we have a treaty which the governments of India and Burma have refused to sign and which that other great Asian nation, China, has not been invited to sign. We can see therefore that the great populations of Asia are not in agreement with this treaty, which is more vital to them than it is to Canada or perhaps even to any of the nations which attached their signatures to the treaty at San Francisco.

Thus the Pacific nations which ordinarily might be considered to be the most concerned in the provisions of the treaty were either critical, like the Philippines or Indonesia or some of the other powers that were interested, or refused altogether to approve it. As I have said, Japan's great neighbour, China, had no part in it. I say that this is a serious matter for the rest of the world.

What Canada's part in the actual making of the treaty was, of course, we do not know. We do know that consultations were held between our minister of external affairs and the Department of External Affairs, and Mr. Dulles and the state department of the United States; but what suggestions, what considerations or what modifications were advanced we do not know. Certainly our interest lies to a very large extent, not only in the political implications of this treaty, which are great, but in certain specific fields which are mainly economic.

Our trade with Japan prior to the war placed us in the position of fourth among the nations trading with that country in 1938, and third in 1951. Perhaps 1938 is not a good year to take as a criterion of our trade with Japan, because in that year our exports were largely of raw materials and potential war supplies, but 1951 is a criterion. In both those years our exports were mainly minerals, lumber and other raw materials. It is certain that if Japan is to improve her standard of living she must have raw materials. To improve her standard of living is in our opinion the best way to combat totalitarianism of any description. It must be remembered that there is more than one form of totalitarianism and Japan may be threatened by more than one form. Consequently she must have access to raw materials and to markets. Indeed her main market must be China and the Asian mainland.

Competition from low living standard areas is a threat, of course, to the higher standards of living of other countries. Japan's main market should be where manufactured articles from Japan are so badly needed, on the Asian mainland.

Indeed the United States as the occupying power has recognized this because she has not forbidden all trade with the Chinese mainland. The Japanese are trading with the Chinese today for raw materials and food in return for certain manufactured goods and materials.

To what extent the occupation forces in Japan have been able to improve living standards since the end of the war is problematical, but I believe they have done something toward this end. It is in this field that I think every effort must be made by the western powers to raise as rapidly as possible the standards of living of the Japanese workers, peasants and people generally. Indeed that is our protection against competition from all low living standard areas.

Canada's principal interest, as I said, is at the moment economic. Canada's principal economic interest in the text of the treaty is

in connection with the conservation of our halibut, salmon and herring fisheries off the Pacific coast. I know that an agreement was made subsequently, but I contend that this treaty should have contained specific clauses binding the Japanese to observe any international conservation treaties that exist or are essential to the well-being of this great industry and this great source of food supply, not only for Canada but for the rest of the world.

Article 9 of the treaty only compels Japan to negotiate with the nations interested in conservation policies in the north Pacific, not to accept a treaty. I repeat that we believe the treaty should have committed her to the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty or treaties in this regard and on a long-term basis. I think our government can be criticized for its failure to secure a more specific understanding on this important matter before we attached our signature to the treaty. The temporary five-year agreement signed in December will be reviewed by our standing committee on marine and fisheries and then we shall have a better understanding of it. I hope it is a better agreement than I believe it to be at the moment.

What we are doing in approving this treaty, I take it, is to make a gesture of unprecedented good will and to help build a democratic Japan which will co-operate with the rest of the democratic world in promoting peace and good will among men in the Far East, in North America, in Europe, in Africa or wherever men may live. That is our hope in giving approval to this treaty, and only time will tell whether we are justified or not in placing so much faith in this country so soon after a long and aggressive war which brought so much suffering and inflicted so much cruelty upon the rest of the world, a war carried on under the leadership of the former militaristic government of imperial Japan.

I should like to read another comment by Walter Lippmann in an article from which I have already quoted appearing in today's Montreal Gazette. While at the moment it applies to Korea I think it has equal application to the treaty with Japan that we are now discussing. Indeed if we substituted Japan for Korea I think it has a bearing which we should take into consideration. Of course he is dealing with the present situation in Korea, but it applies equally to the Japanese treaty we are discussing now.

He says:

A Korean treaty, which was not underwritten by the real government of China and the real government of Japan, is manifestly not going to be more than a very provisional arrangement. Fictitious governments can make only fictitious treaties. No

Japanese Peace Treaty matter how superior they may be morally to the actual governments, the treaties they could sign about the Far East would be like the cheques drawn by a high-born gentleman who has overdrawn his account.

To what extent the present government of Japan is, in the sense in which he uses the word, a fictitious government I am not in a position to say, but it is a government that has been elected while the country has been under the control of an army of occupation. It may not of course be a fictitious government, but the point he makes is well taken. Let us hope that the cheque we are endorsing this afternoon will not one day prove to have been drawn on an already overdrawn account.