Mr. Fraser:

A rubber one.

Mr. Coldwell:

While we have, as I have said, important reservations about this treaty, we accept it. We accept it as a gesture of reconciliation and an expression of our desire for a peaceful settlement not only of the war with Japan but of Far Eastern problems. That under the circumstances is indeed all that we can do, though we are far from satisfied with the treaty and far from satisfied, in view of the absence of India, Burma and China from the signatories of the treaty, that it will endure. However, with such reservations we accept it.

Mr. Solon E. Low (Peace River):

Mr. Speaker, at first glance the Japanese peace treaty, which is before us for consideration today, appears to be a soft treaty. Perhaps that is why so many people have spoken of it as a soft treaty, meaning, I take it, that they think it does not impose upon the vanquished nation the same kind of retributive conditions which we are accustomed to seeing victor nations impose in the form of so-called peace treaties. I have learned that there is ...'.ch resentment amongst the Japanese people over this soft treaty talk. They do not think it is an easy treaty in any respect, and unless the rank and file of the Japanese people can feel easy in their minds about it and can be brought to accept it without too many reservations then the treaty itself is bound to fail.

In my opinion there are features of the treaty which indicate that we have learned a few things as a result of the mistakes that victor nations have made in the past. The treaty in some respects does mark progress toward real enlightenment since the days of the treaty of Versailles which ended the first world war. The severely retributive nature of the treaty of Versailles prepared the soil and sowed the seeds of world war II. But I cannot agree with those who claim that the Japanese peace treaty is soft and that it does not contain the seeds of future war. I am

Japanese Peace Treaty convinced that it does contain seeds of discontent which may lead to war in the future. In my judgment in one respect at least the treaty is retributive; and, since it is retributive, no matter to how small an extent, then I claim it does not lay down a solid foundation for peace nor a reasonable basis for firm faith and good will between the Japanese people and the western Christian nations.

Today the Japanese people are openly and volubly complaining about the territorial losses imposed by the treaty. I have to ask myself whether these complaints are justified or whether they are merely the protest of a people who are expected to put on a show but who know that they have not much, if any, real reason to kick. I suggest that the answer must be sought in the facts about Japan's productive capacity, her food problems, her population and her history. I should like to refer briefly to the section of the treaty purporting to adjust territories, chapter II. The first subsection of article 2 reads as follows:

Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.

With respect to Korea, Mr. Speaker, note that according to the treaty Japan recognizes the independence of a Korea the southern part of which Japan has held more or less tightly or loosely since the Empress Jingu put it under Japanese rule late in the fourth century. That is a long time. Japan has never abrogated the rights she obtained by conquest in Korea. Yet we come along and shear away territories she has held and rights she felt she was justified in holding and in claiming that have their roots away back in the fourth century. Subsection (b) of article 2 reads:

Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.

I would point out that according to Japanese history Formosa has been held bv Japan since it was ceded to her by the treaty of Shimonoseki, I think it was called, in 1895 at the conclusion of the war with China. That goes a long way back. Suppose we began to shear away territories from Great Britain that she obtained through treaty no longer ago than 1895.

Mr. Blackmore:

Or the United States.

Mr. Low:

Yes. I wonder what the situation would be. Subsection (c) of article 2 reads:

Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile islands-

Let me interpolate that Japan exchanged Sakhalin for the Kurile islands in 1875.

-and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.

That goes back a long way, to the end of the Russo-Japanese war.

So it goes on. I will not weary the house by reading the remaining portion of article 2, but I do point out that we are doing a serious thing when we shear away territories to which Japan obtained right and title many years ago, which historically she has never abrogated at any time. Then it seems to me article 3, still dealing with territorial adjustment, gives Russia and the communist leaders every opportunity to say here is a fine example of high-handed United States imperialism. Are we going to play into the hands of Moscow? I feel we should have used better judgment than this. Note the words:

Japan will concur-

How? By having her nose stuck right in it.

-in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude (including the Ryukyu islands and the Daito islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin islands, Rosario island and the Volcano islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.

That gives these people in the communist nations behind the iron curtain plenty of scope to make the claim, and document it to some extent, that the United States is indeed imperialistic in its designs. I should have thought we would avoid such a thing in days as dangerous as these. I believe some of these territories have been of tremendous importance to Japan for many years. They are areas in which Japan has been very largely able to build up her population, and when contemplating this treaty I am led to ask myself: Can Japan afford to lose them? Can she possibly feed, clothe and shelter her present population without these territories? Can she do that with any degree of success, as measured by the happiness and well-being of the Japanese people? Let us just take a quick look at the population of Japan and the food problem, in order to reach some sort of judgment on these questions. The estimated population of Japan today is 83 million, exclusive of Korea and Formosa. The average density of population for the whole country is close to 500 per square mile. Think of that. Then when we calculate the

density of that population in relation to the cultivated area, the Japanese density is around 3,000 per square mile, which is twice that of Belgium and four times that of England.

Let us look at these things squarely. Japan has experienced a tremendous increase in population since 1852, when Commodore Perry signed a treaty with the shogun. At that time the population stood at 27 million; but after 1852 improved living conditions, progressive improvement in agriculture, industrial growth, the expansion of their territory and the intelligent colonization of the territories that were acquired stimulated the population increase so that by 1927 there were 61,316,000 people in Japan, again exclusive of Formosa and Korea. So that we can have a basis for comparison. Since 1927 the population is estimated to have increased at the rate of 750,000 per year.

What about emigration? What has' it done to relieve the situation? Emigration has been negligible. Not more than 20,000 a year of that 750,000 increase have emigrated from the country.

Mr. Blackmore:

Or been permitted to

emigrate.

Mr. Low:

By nature the Japanese have

been a stay-at-home people. They have not been inclined to settle even in Korea and Formosa, their own territories, without having considerable pressure brought to bear upon them. The question is this, and in my judgment it is a very serious question: how to feed the rapidly growing population of Japan. I say that is the beginning and the end of the population problem for Japan; how to feed and clothe them. The country must be considered poor by comparison with most countries of the world. Japan has only a small tillable area with fertile soil, as everyone knows who is familiar with her geography. Most of Japan is rough volcanic rock; and the Climatic conditions and soil are such that no edible animals have ever been indigenous to the country. Few acres of grass lands exist on which to pasture cattle or sheep or other meat producing animals. Consequently the Japanese have rarely been able to consume much meat. In 1931 the per capita consumption of meat in Japan was two and one-half pounds. That seems unbelievable, doesn't it, when we realize that in the same year the average American consumed 280 pounds of meat. Stop to think about it and you begin to see the magnitude of the problem faced by 83 million people. It is true the lack of meat is compensated for to

Japanese Peace Treaty some extent by rather extensive fisheries, and of course we recognize that fish is good food.

The main universal article of diet in Japan is rice; but in spite of a fairly large production of this grain Japan has by no means become self-sufficient in its diet. Even while holding Korea, Formosa and the islands and territories now being shorn away by this treaty, the Japanese were greatly worried over the problem of feeding their hungry millions. The ever normal granary in that country, I would think, decade after decade was never more than 25 million bushels of rice. That is a rather slim resource with which to take care of 83 million people.

So I say that even before the war the Japanese were greatly worried about the rapidly growing population in relation to their available food supplies. Even at that time the Japanese people realized only too well that it is difficult to be happy and contented on a beggar's ration. So even before the war of 1939-45 considerable scientific discussion took place in Japan as to the possible need to return to the birth control measures which were practised fairly extensively and in various fonms in earlier times, I imagine if one were to travel through Japan today he would find such discussions going on in intellectual circles.

In the light of all I have said about food and territories, and many other things that could be cited-of course I am only touching the surface-what terrible consequences are bound to follow the imposition of the territory reduction clauses of the treaty now before us? Is it to be considered that the Japanese race have not the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness? Or are we to force upon them a peace treaty parts of which must be couched in punitive terms because Japan went to war against the United States m 1941 and lost that war?

Let us make it abundantly clear that in anything I have to say in connection with 'this treaty this afternoon I want it to be understood that I deplored at that time the growth of Japan's military junta which, in so many respects, resembled the German war lords, the Junkers machine. I did not in any way defend the sudden development of fascism and the fascist state which was Japan in 1941, nor did I excuse Japan's lightning attack on Pearl Harbor nor the bestial atrocities committed during the war. I condemned those things in the strongest possible way then as I condemn them now. In spite of all those reprehensible things I must say that the territorial adjustments in this treaty are

Japanese Peace Treaty punitive. If Japan had a hard time feeding, clothing and housing her millions of citizens while she held Korea, Formosa, the Kuriles and all those other territories that are being shorn away by this treaty, how can anyone in his right mind expect her to look after the people adequately after such drastic territorial reductions as we are now asked to approve? If that does not contain seeds of discontent and war, then I should like to be set right.

Let us take a look at another feature of the treaty which I feel sometimes escapes notice. For just a minute or two I am going to speak about trade, which takes me over to article 12 in the treaty. In my judgment article 12 definitely puts a limitation upon Japanese trade. In the first subsection, Japan declares its readiness to promptly enter into negotiations for the conclusion with each of the allied powers of treaties or agreements to place their trading, maritime and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis. Well, that is good.

Section (b) of article 12 states:

Pending the conclusion of the relevant treaty or agreement, Japan will, during a period of four years from the first coming into force of the present treaty,

(1) accord to each of the allied powers, its nationals, products and vessels

(i) most-favoured-nation treatment with respect to customs duties, charges, restrictions and other regulations on or in connection with the importation and exportation of goods;

And so on. This only imposes; what the United States has been itching to impose upon other nations in the world, the unconditional most-favoured-nation trading clause in treaties. Let me say this. This section of the treaty imposes a serious limitation in Japan's trade. It imposes or seeks to impose upon Japan utopian ideas which, because of the United States refusal to be realistic, are utterly impossible of successful application in a world such as we live in today. That being the case, Mr. Speaker, it contains the seeds of discontent which may at any time-

Mr. Pearson:

Will the hon. member permit a question?

Mr. Low:

Yes.

Mr. Pearson.:

Will he read section (c) of article 12 on that point?

Mr. Low:

Yes, I noticed the escape clause. But, Mr. Speaker, just let me suggest as a reply, and I do so without strong feeling one way or another, that the minister say whether it is not true that the sole judge as to what constitutes essential security or unreasonableness will be the United States of America, who imposed the most-favoured-nation clause upon Japan in the first place. Now, it is quite correct, and I shall read section (d) -

Mr. Pearson:

Section (c).

Mr. Low:

Sections (c) and (d). I should like to read section (d) as the answer to any application of this article. It reads:

In the application of this article, a discriminatory measure shall not be considered to derogate from the grant of national or most-favoured-nation treatment, as the case may be, if such measure is based on an exception customarily provided for in the commercial treaties of the party applying it, or on the need to safeguard that party's external financial position or balance of payments (except in respect to shipping and navigation), or on the need to maintain its essential security interests, and provided such measure is proportionate to the circumstances and not applied in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.

Now, Mr. Speaker, who is it that judges that? It is one nation. Under those circumstances, the escape clause means nothing. If Japan is going to trade at all she will have to accept what is set out in article 12, section (b) (1), the unconditional most-favourednation clause. We hope that Japan in the days ahead will do just exactly as the minister said he hoped she would do last night, that is follow internationally accepted fair trade practices. I hope .that that will be true, and I feel quite sure that unless her trading relations are too severely circumscribed Japan will have that will. But imposing upon Japan the unconditional most-favoured-nation clause in trade treaties is not the way to ensure this fair trade practice. This clause will place drastic limitations upon Japan's trade, and Japan is already having plenty of trouble in this field.

For a moment I should like to point out an article in the April 5 issue of "Foreign Trade", put out by the Department of Trade and Commerce. On page 411 we find this information concerning Japan's trade pattern changes:

Japan's exports for 1951, according to the Ministry of Finance, were valued at $1,365 million, 64-9 per cent above the 1950 total of $828 million. On the other hand, imports were valued at $2,043 million, 111-3 per cent over the previous year's total of $967 million.

The uneven distribution of Japan's imports and exports between the dollar and sterling areas presents a serious problem. In 1950, 47 per cent of Japan's exports went to the dollar area, 29 per cent to the sterling area, and 24 per cent to the open account areas. Japan's imports that year followed much the same pattern; 44 per cent from the dollar area, 31 per cent from the sterling area, and 25 per cent from the open account areas.

Let me emphasize this part of the article on page 411 of "Foreign Trade".

The pattern changed in 1951, with 24 per cent of Japan's exports going to the dollar area, 42 per cent to the sterling area, and 34 per cent to the open account areas. Against this, 56 per cent of imports came from the dollar area, 25 per cent from the sterling area, and 19 per cent from the open account areas. As a result, Japan's foreign trade with the dollar area showed a large unfavourable balance, while trade with the sterling area

showed a substantial credit balance. The sterling balance accumulated rapidly in the final quarter of the year and the government took action to encourage more imports from the sterling area and, where possible, to switch the purchase of essential materials from the dollar to the sterling countries.

Then, in conclusion the article says this, and it seems to me it is very pertinent:

Japan cannot continue to buy from the dollar area and sell in the sterling area. Efforts must be made to increase exports and to bring prices into line with those in world markets. The country must be able to produce, economically and efficiently, goods of a standard acceptable in world markets.

I ask, Mr. Speaker, how can they do that if they suffer limitations on their trade, and if they are circumscribed by the unconditional most-favoured-nation clause which I think aggravated, if it did not cause, the war between that country and the United States. I do not wish to take up too much time on this occasion, but once again let me say that I believe the treaty, in many of its features, is a good treaty. I believe that in perhaps most of its features it can be said to be a fair treaty, and it is gratifying to me today to see the end of a state of war with Japan.

We approve of the resolution, but we do so with some reluctance and with some reservation. It may be, as the minister said last night, the best possible treaty under all the circumstances. I do not know. But we warn all men that the treaty, generous as it is in some respects, still contains the seeds either of another war or of the destruction of the nations and the peoples who, with reasonable Christian treatment, could be induced to stand solidly with the democracies and the western nations, and to contribute substantially to the welfare of humanity. We denounce, of course, those parts of the treaty which we believe sow the seeds of dissension and possibly of war.

Mr. J. M. Macdonnell (Greenwood):

Mr. Speaker, I do not rise at this time to make a lengthy speech, but merely to say that I have been keenly interested in what has been said by the hon. member for Peace River (Mr. Low), and the aspect of the matter with which he dealt. I do hope the minister will, as I have no doubt he intends to do, answer in considerable detail what has been said.

Mr. J. H. Blackmore (Lethbridge):

Mr. Speaker, I had hoped there would be considerably more discussion of this important treaty, and a great many more members in the house to consider it than we see here this afternoon. As the hon. member for Peace River (Mr. Low) has indicated, now is the time when we lay or do not lay the foundation

Japanese Peace Treaty for world war III-when we are considering the treaties of peace, by, through, and as a result of, which we terminate recent wars.

This treaty must be judged in the light of the answer to these questions: To what extent is the treaty likely to sow the seeds of an inevitable future war? To what extent is it likely to give the Japanese encouragement to become the great and friendly Christian nation we hope for-or, if not a Christian nation, at least a religious and God-fearing nation, observing the principles of righteous living?

Before proceeding to what I intend to say, I am tempted to refer briefly to the atrocities committed by the military caste in Japan. I believe in this connection I can use a homely illustration. If you torment a bull until you get him so angry that he is almost utterly mad, do not be surprised by anything he does to you, once he starts.

That must be borne in mind. The great question we need to ask ourselves is this: In what sort of absolutely impossible position were the Japanese people placed, and for how long had that impossible position been developing? What evidence did they have that there was utterly no way out of their difficulty, except by the bloody arbitrament of war, and how fully were they convinced that if they did not destroy their enemy, then ultimately their enemy would utterly destroy them?

Those are the questions which must be asked. If a man is sufficiently convinced that another man wants to destroy him, and is going to destroy him, then the first man will do everything within his power to destroy the second, before that second man acts. It is much the same with nations.

Having said that, I think we must look with a measure of indulgence or, shall I say, charity, on the atrocities committed by the Japanese as well as by the Germans in the great struggle. I am not condoning those things. I am merely seeking to understand, and to make allowances for them.

Turning to the treaty under consideration I would say that as an instrument having for its purpose the termination of hostilities, the present peace treaty might be acceptable; but as an instrument for establishing peace and prosperity and freedom among men, it is gravely deficient, and therefore unacceptable. This does not mean I propose to vote against it. The position I shall take has been expressed admirably by the hon. member for Peace River.

Let me lay down a few general and fundamental principles-and for anyone who happens to be interested I would refer him to my speech of April 2 which, in a way,

Japanese Peace Treaty was simply the procedure of laying the foundation for the speech I intend to deliver today. This is a practical application of the principles I therein laid down.

Every nation, every people, every community on earth has an inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness-pursuit of happiness regardless of race, colour, creed or geographical position. This is the situation, provided, first, that the world's resources are adequate to support such a standard of living and, secondly, that the community under consideration is willing to pull its full share of the load of production, distribution and management of the goods and services required by mankind.

There is some argument among men as to whether the world has the resources. I think from the evidence at my disposal it is beyond all shadow of doubt that the world does have the resources from which people now living on earth can, if they so choose, produce all the goods that all the people of the whole world need, in order to give them life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

Anyone who is at all familiar with the Japanese will freely acknowledge that individually and collectively the Japanese willingly and effectually pull their share of the load, and have done so ever since we first knew them. They are energetic, skilful, resourceful, sober, industrious and patient. They are highly intelligent, highly conscientious, highly talented, honourable and highly ambitious. They are earnest, sincere, self-sacrificing and realistic. They are deeply religious and reverent, nobly proud, sensitive and loyal. They are admirably cultured, refined and law-abiding.

I have had the advantage of having taught scores upon scores of Japanese boys and girls in schools. I have the honour of representing thousands of them who live in my constituency, whom I have seen in action, and who have proved the truth of what I say concerning them.

Beyond all shadow of doubt the Japanese have pulled adequately their load, or their share of the load, and are willing to continue to do so if we white people can only somehow or other acquire sense enough to set up an economic system in the world under which they will have a chance to pull their share. And this latter "if" is a major consideration in all our discussions at the present time. Such facts being borne in mind, we must agree that the Japanese have, and should be guaranteed.-and I repeat "guaranteed"-their inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. By that I do not mean that we necessarily need to give them goods. I do not even mean that we need to accept their

goods in exchange for our goods. I mean that we must set up such an arrangement of circumstances as will give them the full chance to work to earn their way. That will be all they will ever ask. Does this present Japanese peace treaty adequately support them in that right which I have laid down and which I believe all people will freely concede?

To all those who have read through the treaty with impartial care, and who have studied the meaning and implication of certain of its clauses, studied them with understanding and appreciation, against the background of Japanese and United States history over the century just past, to all those, it is patently evident that in the economic field the treaty deprives the Japanese of that economic freedom of action which is indispensable to them, if they are to gain for themselves a fair share of the good things which the world's peoples could and would and should produce.

Furthermore, the treaty makes no apparent provision for the removal of the great basic, inescapable, unsupportable and intolerable cause which impelled the Japanese to enter world war II. That cause, as I will later develop, was the unconditional most-favourednation clause, as insisted upon by the United States, and I propose to prove it.

The punitive, the punishing clauses of the treaty, as the hon. member for Peace River (Mr. Low) has so well pointed out, wrest from Japan numbers of possessions which, in her struggle to make a living, were of substantial assistance to Japan. They thereby leave Japan, economically speaking, much more vulnerable than she was before world war II, unless compensatory measures, ample and adequately perpetual, be guaranteed that nation, until such time as Japan might, with realism, be said to have acquired the actual means of earning her living among the nations.

Unfortunately, I had to be out of the house for a minute or two. I was called out and I am not just sure what the hon. member for Peace River put on the record, but I am impressed with article 10 of the treaty. Let me read article 10 to show how far afield the great United States went to wrest from Japan the advantage which she had gained through the years:

Japan renounces all special rights and interests in China, including all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final protocol signed at Peking on September 7, 1901,-

Imagine going back there. I continue:

-and all annexes, notes and documents supplementary thereto, and agrees to the abrogation in respect to Japan of the said protocol, annexes, notes and documents.

It would take a panel of "Philadelphia lawyers" to prove that that was not punitive; it strains in the matter of being punitive. It looks as though it were dictated by a nation which was literally determined to destroy Japanese power and national independence and efficiency outright, regardless of the pretty words-most of which are weasel words-which might be used by the United States in this or any other connection by that nation.

Are such punitive measures warrantable? Some will say: "Well, look what the Japanese did to us. They deserve to be treated that way!" Well, those who know history raise this question: Look at what we did to the Japanese for fifty years! Let us get that out into the open and see what allowances we ought to make for that.

Is this neglect to provide for the removal of the fundamental cause of Japanese participation in world war II justifiable? I will say certainly it is not.

This brings us to the question: What caused the Japanese to strike at the United States at Pearl Harbor? The cause of world war II between Japan and the United States was the United States' insistence, as I indicated a moment ago, upon Japanese acceptance of the unconditional most-favourednation clause in trading.

Japan is a "have-not" nation. Long experience had convinced the Japanese that if they were ever to be able to give their people a standard of living consonant with an age of abundance through machines, technological skills such as plastics, and the use of solar power, in a world as richly endowed as this in which we dwell, if she were ever to be able to give her people an equitable share of the good things our world can produce, then she must co-operate with other "have-not" nations by the use of devices resembling imperial preferences which the British empire had employed so successfully through the years, and especially since 1932.

Now, the great question when we undertake to appraise the iniquity, or lack of it, in the Japanese, in attacking at Pearl Harbor, the great question we have to look at is this: Did the Japanese have a perfect right to work with other little nations, other "have-not" nations, by the use of imperial preferences or something resembling them? Did they have the right to do that? Were they committing a crime which deserved to be punished by the outrageous measures which I have indicated, when they insisted they ought to be able to use imperial preferences, preferential treatment, such as the British had used? I doubt whether any member in this house would rise and say

Japanese Peace Treaty that they did not have the right to use preferences such as we had used, and such as we shall use again if we have right good sense, and can ever get ourselves out from under the domination of the United States long enough to do it. That is what Japan insisted on, the right to work with other little fellows like herself through employment of preferences.

Because the United States refused to grant her that right, and insisted, as I will show, then the Japanese decided there was only one thing to do about it. Probably we should be appreciating the fact that they were so long-suffering before they made up their minds to that extent. Japan conceived of making such arrangements as imperial preferential arrangements with her neighbour "have-not" nations, particularly China. The United States was determined that the Japanese people should not use imperial preferences in dealing with China. The Japanese held out with the obstinacy of despair, just as, Mr. Speaker, I will warrant any group of men from this house would do if they were placed under the same set of circumstances. The United States insisted right up to November 26, as I will show, if I have time enough to put on record the quotations at my disposal.

The United States had already seriously hurt the Japanese. How? First, she froze Japanese credits in the United States in 1938. Second, the Anglo-American trade agreement which she forced upon Great Britain in 1938 rigidly applied the unconditional mostfavoured-nation clause against Japan. Third, she gave notice to Japan in July 1939 that she would terminate in six months the United States-Japanese commercial treaty of 1911 because the United States felt that that treaty was not affording adequate protection to United States commerce, either in Japan or Japanese-controlled areas in China, and because the most-favoured-nation clause in that treaty-not unconditional in that case- was a bar to the adoption by the United States of retaliatory measures against Japanese commerce-what do you think about denouncing a treaty because of those two reasons? Fourth, she applied moral embargoes against the Japanese in 1938 and 1939. The result of this move on the part of the United States, together with the conditions prevailing generally throughout the world as a result of the depression, rendered the position of Japan practically intolerable.

The United States, because of her economic strength, was in a position to hurt the Japanese even more seriously. The Japanese chose what appeared to them to be the most advantageous time for success, and they struck. They struck while we were occupied

Japanese Peace Treaty with Germany and Italy so that they had the best chance of succeeding that probably they would have in a hundred years.

What evidence can be brought forward in support of my position? There are three main classes of evidence. First are the documents bearing directly upon the United States-Japanese war which provide unanswerable evidence that the United States demands as regards the unconditional mostfavoured-nation clause caused the war. Second, incidents from recent history illustrate the results of United States policy as a result of the unconditional most-favourednation clause from, we will say, 1922, when she declared it, and began to put it into operation, right down to the present time. All of which goes to show that the United States was already causing painful difficulty to nations all over the world because she was insisting on the application of that iniquitous unconditional most-favoured-nation clause.

The third set of evidences would be made up of the pronouncements of United States public men during the last twenty years which proved that they were convinced of the efficacy of the unconditional most-favourednation clause and were resolved to force it upon other nations. Their declarations concerning the Bretton Woods agreement are a good example. Their declarations concerning the importance of the Geneva trade agreements and the international trade organization, which I referred to the other day, are also evidence. Probably I shall not have time enough to go into these two latter matters in detail, although I have the information under my hand so that I could do so if it were considered fitting, or if we had time.

Now, what caused the Japanese to go to war? I should like to read from a United States source, the conclusions of the U.S. army Pearl Harbor board issued on October 20, 1944, and published on August 29, 1945. I shall read only one conclusion, which is as follows:

C. We turn now to responsibilities:

1. The secretary of state-the Honourable Cordell Hull. The action of the secretary of state in delivering the counter-proposals of Nov. 26, 1941, was used by the Japanese as the signal to begin the war by the attack on Pearl Harbor. To the extent that it hastened such attack it was in conflict with the efforts of the war and navy departments to gain time for preparations for war. However, war with Japan was inevitable and imminent because of irreconcilable disagreements between the Japanese empire and the American government.

No statement, as you see, as to what is the nature of the disagreement! I shall have to turn to other documents to find that. I read now an extract from a "memorandum of a conversation between the secretary of state

and the Japanese Ambassador Nomura" on October 2, 1941, in Washington. I quote:

The ambassador said that he felt that the only point on which he anticipated difficulty in the two governments reaching an agreement was in regard to the question of retention of Japanese troops in China. He thought that, with regard to the question of discrimination, the Japanese government would meet us. The secretary emphasized that in his opinion no country would stand to gain more than Japan from the general universal application of the most favoured nation principle. The secretary added that he would like to give the ambassador a report of the Lima conference containing the resolutions adopted in regard to economic matters and he suggested that the Japanese government might be interested in adopting similar policies in the Far East. The ambassador said that Japanese present-day thought with respect to regional economic blocs-

Which of course is the principle of little-boy nations getting together and playing the game according to their own little-boy rules. -was the result of circumstances, that is to say, of measures taken by other countries such as the empire preferences introduced at Ottawa. The secretary replied that he had been fighting such measures as those taken at Ottawa and he would like to have Japan join with the United States in fighting for liberal economic policies.

How could the cause 1 have named be more clearly indicated than in that passage? I turn now to an extract from a memorandum of a conversation between the secretary of state and Japanese Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu at Washington on November 18, 1941, and I quote:

The secretary pointed out also that we are even now engaged in efforts to induce the British empire to reduce its empire preferences. He said that what we desire is to put our people back to work in a way that can never be accomplished through permitting armies to overrun countries. The secretary observed that many Japanese spokesmen had spoken of Japan's desire to have a controlling influence in Eastern Asia, but the only kind of controlling influence which was worth anything was one which could not be achieved or maintained by the sword. He dwelt briefly upon what we have accomplished in South America through our peaceful policies and through renouncing the employment of gunboats and armed forces.

Once more we have a reference to the imperial preferences which the British had been using, measures which would be in violation of the unconditional most-favourednation clause!

I quote now from a document handed by the secretary of state to Japanese Ambassador Nomura at Washington, November 26, 1941. I think I shall have to give these excerpts more in detail than I intended because otherwise people may think that I am not quite fair. This reads:

Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan

Section 1.

Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy.

The government of the United States and the government of Japan both being solicitous for the

peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighbouring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

I skip the first two principles and read the third. It is as follows:

The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

These 'are the same weasel words which the United States uses all the time and which mean the destruction of the imperial preference principles

4. The principle of reliance upon international co-operation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes. The government of Japan and the government of the United States have agreed that towards eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

1. The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

That is just as clear as words can make it.

2. The principle of international economic co-operation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.

3. The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.

4. The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

5. The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

A well informed person reading No. 5 ithinks immediately of Bretton Woods, the international monetary fund.

Section 2.

Steps to be taken by the government of the United States and by the government of Japan.

The government of the United States and the government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

(1) The government of the United States and the government of Japan will endeavour to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, The Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

From No. 2 I select the following words in the interests of brevity:

Such agreement would provide also that each of the governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its

Japanese Peace Treaty

trade or economic relations with Indo-China and would use his influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indo-China.

Once more the most-favoured-nation clause simply screams out. Then I come to No. 6 which reads:

(6) The government of the United States and the government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favoured-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

May I make the comment that the United States has a tariff protection and a system of import restrictions which is so high and so efficient that any other nation on the earth can reduce its trade by a certain amount and the United States can reduce correspondingly and still beat that nation hands down. No. 8 reads as follows:

(8) Both governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

That is pretty conclusive, is it not? It does not leave very much room for doubt.

I come now to quotations from a memorandum handed by Japanese Ambassador Nomura to the secretary of state at 2.20 p.m., December 7, 1941. From this rather extended document in which the Japanese realistically and factually, and I believe truthfully, discussed the issues at stake between the United States and Japan I select one or two salient passages. The Japanese are talking. My first quotation reads as follows:

The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favourable to it and urges upon the Japanese government acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

How could the case be more beautifully and realistically put? I find my time is passing. I shall have to leave out some of what it would be appropriate to read into Hansard. I shall however read two more passages from this document:

Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the nine power treaty structure which is the chief factor responsible for the present predicament of East Asia.

Japanese Peace Treaty

This is the Japanese speaking. I should like to read one more quotation, the closing words, reading as follows:

Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through co-operation with the American government has finally been lost. The Japanese government regrets to have to notify hereby the American government that in view of the attitude of the American government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

That is pathetic, is it not? There are the last words that passed between the two nations before they were in a state of war.

I should like now to read a quotation from a memorandum with respect to the conversation between the secretary of state and the Japanese Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu. It reads as follows:

After the secretary had read two or three pages-

That refers to the document I have just been quoting.

-he a-ked the ambassador whether this document was presented under instructions of the Japanese government. The ambassador replied that it was. The secretary as soon as he had finished reading the document turned to the Japanese ambassador and said, "I must say that in all my conversations with you (the Japanese ambassador) during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions-infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them.

The Japanese all the way through had been realistic and truthful. The Americans simply imagined they themselves were, just as they do today. It must be obvious that the reason why the Japanese struck was, as they said in the closing words of the second last document from which I quoted, that there was just no real use of trying to reason with the United States in a realistic manner at all. Having been brought to that conclusion by decades of experience and by months of negotiations and conferences, what is the degree of culpability which must be attached to the Japanese for the attack on Pearl Harbor? And what is the degree of inescapable culpability which must be attached to the United States? I suppose no person or combination of persons alive can possibly answer that question exactly right. Even if they did, the answer would probably be disagreed with by pretty nearly everybody. Nevertheless I quote all this to show that the trouble is not all on one side, and that the trouble is not going to be all on one side in the days yet to come, if the United States insists on the senseless attitude she is now

adopting in respect of the unconditional mostfavoured-nation clause in the trade arrangements among nations.

Just before I conclude, in addition to the fine array of evidence the hon. member for Peace River (Mr. Low) marshalled before us this afternoon I would like to recall to hon. members that the Japanese people are living in a territory no larger than the state of California. Tell me, any member on any side of the house: how would you feel about trying to cram 83 million people into California and provide for them? How would you like to govern California with 83 million people in it? If you did have 83 million people crowded into the state of California, under such restrictions that not one of them could 'leave and go to any other country because the other countries would not accept them, any more than Canada would, so they had to stay there and ultimately die there-

Mr. Sinnott:

That is why they attacked Pearl Harbor. They wanted to get out of Japan.

Mr. Blackmore:

How would you feel about that? And suppose you were ruling California with 83 million Japanese in it trying to find food, clothing and shelter for them, cut off from all the world; suppose you were able to create industrial plants as a result of which you could produce nearly any manufactured product better and cheaper than almost any other nation in the world, and then found yourself hampered and trammelled on every hand by a monster nation like the United States, with not quite twice the number of people in the most productive and resourceful land on earth. If you found the United States interfering with you at every turn when you undertook to trade with other nations to get the raw materials you needed and sell your products: what would you think?

Would you consider a treaty which fixed you in such a restricted and unjust position a good treaty? Would you consider it a generous treaty? Would you consider it a fair treaty? Would you consider it a treaty in the interests of the future welfare of mankind?

Then if you knew that only one nation, your mortal enemy for decades, had drafted the treaty and imposed it upon you, and that this nation by reason of its predominant position in the world was going to impose it upon the various nations of the British commonwealth so they would pass it like a rubber stamp as we are going to pass this treaty soon without careful examination at all, how would you feel? Then if you saw Russia not very far away, making the promises she has been making of late to India and other countries, and apparently ready to keep those

promises, I ask how long you would be able to resist the temptation to go behind the iron curtain, as Czechoslovakia did.

I am not altogether condemning the treaty, Mr. Speaker. I am merely stating reasons why we should give this treaty the utmost study. I am glad we are going to be at peace with Japan; but I urge with all the sincerity of my being that we give the most careful consideration to the realities which confront Japan and ourselves in looking towards the world of tomorrow.

Mr. Pearson:

Mr. Speaker-

Mr. Deputy Speaker:

Order. I must inform the house that if the minister speaks now he will close the debate.

Hon. L. B. Pearson (Secretary of State for External Affairs):

In a very few minutes I am going to try to deal with some of the points which have been raised in the course of this discussion. I need hardly say, I think, that I do not agree with the interpretation of the events leading up to the Japanese war or the analysis of the politics and history of the United States in regard to this matter which were given by the last speaker. Nor can I agree that this treaty in some of its territorial aspects is an evidence of what was referred to by the hon. member for Peace River (Mr. Low) as high-handed United States imperialism.