Hon. G. R. Pearkes (Minister of National Defence):

Both those investigations have been proceedings, Mr. Speaker, and the final reports have not yet been submitted.

Hon. G. R. Pearkes (Minister of National Defence):

Mr. Speaker, when the Pepperrell air base is brought to care and maintenance standards by the United States air force some of the buildings will be vacated. My department has been carrying out a survey to see whether we can use any of those buildings which will be vacated.

Mr. Pearkes:

Yes. When the situation in Elliot Lake developed and the economy of the city was disrupted the department was asked to see if it was possible to locate any unit there. At that time we were considering the possibility of establishing the provost corps school elsewhere than at Shilo because the accommodation in Shilo was required for other things. A reconnaissance party of officers went down and looked over the place. They were shown the greatest courtesy by the mining company there and in Toronto where Mr. Winters went to a good deal of trouble to show the type of accommodation that there was. Unfortunately the accommodation was not centralized in any one place but centred at various points and could not be readily made available, so ultimately it was decided in agreement with the mining company and I believe the city authorities that it would not be practicable to establish a school at Elliot Lake.

Mr. Pearkes:

How do you know that?

Mr. Pearkes:

I am sorry, but there are a number of questions which I do feel I should answer, and also reply to some of the statements which have been made.

The fixed bases of the Bomarc are so small that I think it will be most unlikely that a missile fired from 3,000 to 4,000 miles away would be able to obtain a hit or would 79951-0-483

Supply-National Defence have those sites selected as a target. Of course, one must remember that the jet aircraft must take off from air fields with a comparatively long runway, and I am not at all sure that the air fields capable of supporting jet interceptors would not be just as vulnerable a target as the Bomarc sites. So I really do not see that there is a great deal of argument on that score. We must remember that these two sites are located north of the great industrial cities of eastern Canada and while their primary purpose may be the protection of the SAC bomber bases, they will still offer a considerable degree of protection to the cities in eastern Canada.

Then there is one other point I would like to make in connection with the proposal of the Liberal party in this respect, and that is that it is very much more expensive of course to maintain interceptor squadrons than it is to maintain the Bomarc sites. As I pointed out, Bomarc sites would cost $12 million to $15 million. The number of missiles we may assume to be approximately 30 on each site. As a basis of calculation which has been accepted in the United States, one interceptor would cost the equivalent of three missiles. That would mean that if we were going to replace the missiles with interceptors we should require 180 interceptors to replace the 60 Bomarc missiles. Each of those interceptors might possibly cost about $2 million apiece.

So you see, Mr. Chairman, you would be running up an expense of some $360 million as opposed to the $12 million which the government proposes to spend on the Bomarc missile. Then of course maintenance of the interceptor squadrons is far greater than the maintenance of the Bomarc sites and the number of personnel which are required to man the interceptor squadrons is much greater. The Leader of the Opposition did say that it might not be necessary to employ as many interceptors as there are now being employed in the nine squadrons, so perhaps he does not anticipate using that full number of 180. Actually, today we have considerably more CF-lOO's in our squadrons and reserves than the 180.

Another factor comes up here, and that is that I am very doubtful whether there are available in the United States this number of interceptors which could be obtained readily. Again, it may be-and this was not clear in the remarks which were made-that perhaps they are considering primarily that these interceptors would be used merely for identification and recognition purposes. As I have indicated the government has under consideration the possibility of replacing

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Supply-National Defence some of the CF-lOO's with a limited number of interceptors which could be used for recognition purposes.

Now regarding SAGE, which the Liberals recommended should also be discontinued, SAGE is required. If any interceptors or reconnaissance aircraft, be they for identification or recognition, are flying at supersonic speeds, all United States air force interceptors are equipped with radar which will operate with the SAGE environment. SAGE is being installed from the Atlantic to the Pacific and if we discontinued the one SAGE installation which we are putting in in Canada there will be no opportunity of controlling and guiding the United States interceptors which might in the absence of our own interceptors, or joining with our own interceptors if we had them, do battle in Canadian skies. So I do suggest that it is imperative whether we go ahead with the Bomarc or not that the SAGE environment should be continued and I could not accept the recommendation of the Liberal party that the SAGE environment be discontinued.

The Leader of the Opposition asked questions regarding the negotiations going on in connection with the acquisition of nuclear warheads. We have had a lot of discussion about that and I should have though that the position of the government was clear. We are entering into and have been carrying on discussions at various levels, the official level and between Canadian ministers and United States ministers, as to the sort of arrangement which could be made when nuclear warheads are made available which, as the Prime Minister said, will be so if and when they are required. We recognize, and 1 am sure the Leader of the Opposition does also, that by United States law these nuclear warheads whenever they leave the United States must still remain the property of the United States. So whether these warheads are placed in Canada or in the leased bases in Canada or in the United Kingdom, the United States still retain possession of them until such time as the President of the United States releases them for use to the authorities of the country concerned.

In the United Kingdom where these nuclear weapons are now stored a form of joint control is exercised whereby a United States officer has a key to the receptacle where they are stored and also a British officer has a key, and the door cannot be opened unless both keys are used. So you have a form of joint control not dissimilar to the method which is used by anybody having a safety deposit box in the bank where the banker has one key and the lessee of the box has the other.

There would seem to be no difficulties in the way of reaching some sort of similar agreement regarding the storage of those nuclear weapons on Canadian soil. Then when the situation becomes such that these weapons are to be used, the sole authority to authorize the use of those weapons in Canada would be the Prime Minister of Canada who, having had them released by the President of the United States, would then give directions as to when and how they should be actually used.